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WORK-IN-PROGRESS: GADAMER, TRADITION, AND THE
COMMON LAW
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*

[Tihe conversation that we are in is one that never ends. No word
is the last word, just as there is no first word. Every word is itself
always an answer and gives rise always to a new question.
-Hans-Georg Gadamer 1
INTRODUCTION

The influence of Hans-Georg Gadamer's writings on American
legal theory is both peripheral and profound. It is peripheral in that,
as with most continental scholarship, overt reference to it is limited
and begrudging. Manifesting an all too familiar intellectual xenophobia, few jurists have given his extensive oeuvre of hermeneutical
critique the kind of thorough and critical attention that it warrants.
On the other hand, Gadamer's influence is profound in that many
jurists offer an account of law and adjudication that is heavily
indebted to the general insights and inspiration of his work.
Mediated through the vicarious writings of some American
philosophers, the understanding of law as an interpretive exercise in
which judges must grapple with fixed texts in a changing historical
context has become a matter of trite learning. It is appropriate,
therefore, on Gadamer's centenary that there should be a symposium
that not only will increase the general awareness of Gadamer's ideas
and their influence on American jurisprudential thinking, giving them
the respect and recognition that they merit, but also will provide an
opportunity to subject those ideas to the kind of searching and
sustained scrutiny that has hitherto been largely lacking.
Accordingly, in this Article, I provide an account of the common law
tradition of judging that draws upon Gadamer's writings in advancing
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful to
Simon Archer, Lisa Csele, Tsachi Keren-Paz, William Lucy, Francis Jay Mootz III, and Derek
Morgan for their critical comments and helpful suggestions.
1. Letter from Hans-Georg Gadamer to Fred Dallmayr (1985), in DIALOGUE AND
DECONSTRUCION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 95 (Diane P. Michelfelder &
Richard E. Palmer eds., 1989).
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the intellectual project of critical legal theory. In developing and
substantiating the claim that "law is politics," my interpretation of
Gadamer will be controversial and not to everyone's taste. However,
mindful of the concluding words of Gadamer's Truth and Method that
"[i]t would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have, or
had to have, the last word,' 2 1 celebrate Gadamer in what I believe is
the best and most respectful way. Challenging the textual letter of
Gadamer's writings in the subversive spirit of Gadamer's hermeneutics, I treat Gadamer's answers as provoking, not precluding new
questions and, perhaps, inviting and producing new answers.
I.
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The particular questions and answers that I want to explore are
those that concern the defense of common law adjudication as an
institutional tradition of bounded and neutral decision making. The
so-called hermeneutical turn in jurisprudence -the acknowledgment
that, insofar as law concerns texts, adjudication is an interpretive
exercise-has obliged theorists and lawyers to take seriously (again)
the idea that law is a rhetorical tradition of specialized arguments.
While this greater hermeneutical awareness has strengthened the
jurisprudential project and rendered the resulting theories more
plausible and cogent, it has also revitalized and strengthened the
subversive force of the critical claim that law is not the bounded and
objective process that the mainstream project of jurisprudential
theorizing demands it to be. Once it is conceded that law is a more
vital and less closed affair than was traditionally supposed, the fear
resurfaces that the law will collapse into politics and that there will be
no way to distinguish adjudication from more open-ended processes
for the resolution of moral and political disputes. Moreover,
jurisprudential accounts will themselves run the risk of being treated
as simply an exercise in political rather than philosophical analysis in
which truth and reason are not so much constraints on debate, but
constructs of it. It is this effort to take on board the hermeneutical
insight in order to salvage the jurisprudential project without also
fatally undermining its traditional ambitions that is at the heart of this
Article. In most general terms, my critical claim is that, once history
is included in the task of understanding and justifying the adjudicative
process (as the hermeneutical insight insists that it must be), there is
2. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 579 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald

Marshall trans., Crossroads 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960).
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no effective way to keep the larger forces of ideological contestation
out of the jurisprudential frame. Despite jurists' best efforts to the
contrary, it is my contention that this effort to historicize law and
adjudication in the name of rhetorical knowledge cannot be done
without also politicizing them: the performance of legal adjudication
will be revealed as a thoroughly and unavoidably ideological exercise.
As I will seek to explain, however, this is not the deathblow for law
and adjudication that many believe it to be-it is possible to
understand law and adjudication as thoroughly political without
recommending its complete abandonment.
In contrast to most contemporary jurisprudential scholarship, I
want to contend that utilization of Gadamer's hermeneutics may offer
a more radical and transformative reading of the common law
tradition. In his introduction to Truth and Method, Gadamer cautions
that, while people exist and thrive within a tradition, "it still is part of
the nature of [people] to be able to break with tradition, to criticize
and dissolve it."' Indeed, Gadamer concedes that his hermeneutic
universalism, in emphasizing and giving priority to the past and
tradition, does run the risk of having "a lack of ultimate radicality."4
However, Gadamer insists that this may be the price that has to be
paid in order to establish meaning in people's lives-"[w]hat [people]
need[] is not just the persistent posing of ultimate questions, but the
sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and
In my view, this is both an unnecessary and unwise
now."5
concession: the fear that radicality must be synonymous with "the
On the
nihilism that Nietzsche prophesied ' 6 is unwarranted.
contrary, it is both possible and desirable to run the risk of "ultimate
radicality." 7 Rather than seek to confront the ever intensifying
"criticism of what has gone before" 8 with "something of the truth of
remembrance: with what is still and ever again real,"9 it is better to
abandon truth and remembrance entirely. So disencumbered, people
might step forward into the real and the what-is-yet-to-come in the
exciting hope of contributing to the work-in-progress of law,
tradition, and politics. Accordingly, I offer an account of what
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at xxxvii.
Id.
Id. at xxxviii.
Id. at xxxvii.
Id.
Id. at xxxviii.
Id.
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hermeneutical tradition and legal practice might look like and how it
might be appreciated if the radicality of the hermeneutical insight was
not cabined or contained. Although Gadamer tries to resist the
charge that his work has "legitimated a prejudice in favor of existing
social relations,"' 0 I maintain that Gadamer and his juristic followers,
no matter how noble or progressive their intentions, have managed to
curb rather than cultivate the "critical and emancipatory" instinct."
In this Article, therefore, I want to follow through on where
Gadamer's hermeneutical critique, if pursued rigorously and
unconditionally, might take law and jurisprudence. I explore what it
means to treat law seriously as a living rhetorical tradition or a workin-progress. Of course, the idea of understanding law as a social
practice or tradition is not new and the appreciation that law is always
changing is hardly novel. Nevertheless, the received wisdom remains
that, while law and adjudication are squarely situated in the historical
flow of social life, they march largely to the uniform beat of a
different drummer than society's competing and cacophonous
percussionists; that drummer and that beat are contended to be
distinctly legal rather than insistently ideological. In contrast, my
critical response is that, because law is a social practice and society is
in a constant state of agitation and movement, law is always a workin-progress that is not only never complete or finished, but is always
situated inside and among, not outside and beyond, the ideological
forces at work in society. Insofar as adjudication is a bounded
tradition, it is one in which those bounds are part and parcel of the
political contestation from which they are intended to insulate the
law. There are no solid and secure footings for law and legal theory
that are not themselves inside the very political and situated debate
that they are intended to ground and underwrite: there is no escape
from the messy and contingent facts of social living. And, insofar as it
is possible to think critically about law, it cannot be done by escaping
the concrete and ideological circumstances of law and legal
theorizing: law is a political enterprise and theory is a specialized
form of politics.
In order to address these difficult and hotly debated issues, I
intend to address them through a particular reading of Gadamer's
ideas. I say "through" rather than "with" because I want to suggest
the indeterminacy and dynamism of interpretive work, whether in law
10. Id. at 566.
11. Id. at 567.
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or scholarly endeavour. As I will explain, my approach to the
conundrum of explaining change and continuity in the law is
influenced by my reading of Gadamer. It is neither determined by
my reading of Gadamer, nor does it claim to be the definitive reading
of Gadamer because, like the common law itself, the hermeneutical
genius of Gadamer defies easy understanding or simple elucidation.
So grasped, I intend to utilize the work of Gadamer as part of a
suggestive account of how the common law develops and functions.
Throughout, I want to insist that Gadamer, tradition, and the
common law are best understood as works-in-progress, each of which
whose meaning is never fixed or determined, but is constantly and
continually open to appropriation and transformation. This is not to
say that "anything goes" or that the perceived postmodern nightmare
has become a waking reality. It is intended as an acknowledgment
that there is no master narrative that can explain or do away with the
need or responsibility for choice: what counts as meaning is always
unstable and cannot be a foundation for anything, let alone the
legitimacy of common law adjudication as a mode of objective and
nonideological decision making. Moreover, my own view on what is
and is not a cogent or useful account of law and adjudication is also a
work-in-progress in that this Article acts as a series of glosses and
shifts on the basic themes that my work has hitherto comprised; it
develops and elaborates on earlier ideas as it interrogates and alters
12
them.
The remainder of the Article is divided into eight main parts.
The first two parts set the scene by introducing the jurisprudential
debate on legal hermeneutics that has been played out through the
recent U.S. Supreme Court physician-assisted suicide decision in
Washington v. Glucksberg.13 After isolating some of the more
pertinent critical commentary, I map out the general contours of the
decision, particularly the pivotal and much-heralded opinion written
by Justice Souter. In the next part, I step back and provide a broader
intellectual context for the hermeneutical turn in modern jurisprudential scholarship. I follow that with two parts on Gadamer.
Whereas the first part offers a basic introduction to the main themes
12. The most recent and most sustained account of my ideas on law, politics, and
adjudication can be found in ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A
NONFOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION (2000).

13. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (determining that the state of Washington's law against
assisted suicide did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution).

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1015

in Gadamer's work, the second part challenges the jurisprudential
effort to insist upon a conservative reading of Gadamerian
hermeneutics and its relevance to the common law tradition; the
important interventions of Jay Mootz will be used as a critical foil.
Consequently, the next part proposes a much less conservative and
more radical explication of Gadamer's value to contemporary
jurisprudential endeavours.
The final two parts explore the
implications of this more subversive approach to common law
adjudication. After revisiting Justice Souter's Glucksberg opinion
and reassessing it from a more critical perspective, I trace the more
general repercussions of my insistence that the historicization of law
and adjudication must also entail its politicization. Throughout the
Article, I rely upon the notion of "work-in-progress" as a productive
optic through which to view and appreciate the dynamic and
unfinishable quality of law, interpretation, and criticism. I want to
recommend an approach to the common law adjudicative tradition
that will abandon once and for all the misguided effort to treat it as if
it were a significantly bounded and largely neutral tradition of
argument that is something other than one more site for the
encounter, albeit stylized and staged, between contesting ideological
forces. For me, the common law is an organic and messy practice that
is always moving and, like the society in which it moves, is never
capable of being subsumed under any one theory that can transcend
or finesse ideological contestation. Also, when looked at in the way
that I suggest, the common law is exactly the kind of practice that
might lend itself well to the local, episodic, contextualized, focused,
and work-in-progress kind of politics that is required and possible.
II. THE GLUCKSBERG OPENING
Rather than pursue these issues in the abstract, it is more
instructive to place them in the practical and focused context of an
adjudicated dispute. There is always some danger in concentrating on
one case because no decision can withstand the full force of
jurisprudential scrutiny. However, such a way of proceeding is
preferable to a more sprawling and less detailed approach that is
open to the allegation that discussion is pitched at too abstract and
impractical a level, thereby permitting jurists to get by with vague
generalities and broad statements. Accordingly, in order to focus my
discussion and join issue with those who insist on enlisting Gadamer
in support of a traditional defense of adjudication and jurisprudence,
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I will work through the familiar judgments in the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg. Faced with a challenge to
Washington's legislative prohibition of assisted suicide, the Supreme
Court had to grapple with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which declares that states may not "deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."'1 4 The Court
decided that such a right was not presently so fundamental a liberty
that was protected by the Due Process Clause and, therefore, its
infringement by government was permissible.15 Although the
Supreme Court was unanimous in its decision, it was divided over the
appropriate reasoning for this decision. 16 The Glucksberg opinion has
predictably engendered much debate and disagreement. However,
apart from the popular and strictly ethical discussion about the
propriety of statutes addressing the right to die, the Glucksberg
decision has become the focus of considerable jurisprudential
engagement. Although there were several concurring decisions, the
majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist and the concurring
opinion written by Justice Souter have commanded the most
attention; each represents a very different approach to due process
analysis and, thereby, to the freighted and fraught judicial task of
charting the connection between legal analysis and ethical or political
values in constitutional and common law decision making generally.
In short, jurists have examined critically the jurisprudential basis on
which the competing judges approach that task and the overall style
of adjudicative reasoning.
For example, Ronald Dworkin has chastised the court for its
failure to understand fully the philosophical dimension of
adjudication and the ethical responsibilities of judges in interpreting
the Constitution.17 Having joined with other leading liberal
philosophers including Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls,
Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thompson in submitting an
amicus brief, Dworkin was not pleased with the Supreme Court's
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 735.
16. Id. at 704. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice O'Connor wrote the concurring
opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined in part. Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer also wrote concurring opinions.
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Sept. 25, 1997, at 40, 40-44 [hereinafter Dworkin, Assisted Suicide]; see also Ronald Dworkin,
Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998) [hereinafter Dworkin, Darwin's New
Bulldog].
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decision. 18 Dworkin's displeasure was not simply because the Court
found resoundingly against his particular views on the best moral and
constitutional position on assisted suicide, but because he considered

that the judges had not properly appreciated their sophisticated task
as constitutional interpreters. Dworkin had little good to say about
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who, in taking an entirely
historicist approach and insisting that what has been accepted as
politically fundamental is what is legally fundamental, ignored the

philosophical and critical element of constitutional adjudication; they
reduced it to a crass and conservative enterprise in empirical inquiry.
On the other hand, although Justice Souter's judgment was
"reasonable in principle,"' 19 Dworkin remained unconvinced that the

facts were so sufficiently in dispute as to warrant a hands-off
approach by the courts. Nevertheless, with characteristic ingenuity,
Dworkin refused to accept that all was lost and, arguing that five of

the six justices who wrote opinions did not reject his ethical stance
out-of-hand, hoped that the Court might well come to its
constitutional senses in the future and validate a constitutional right
to die.20
Taking the Glucksberg bait, Richard Posner took Dworkin to
task for his views on how the right to die claims should be resolved
and what valid constitutional adjudication should comprise.21 For
Judge Posner, Dworkin was barking entirely up the wrong tree in

insisting that such disputes require the court to participate in moral
theory; this is the problem, not the solution, in understanding the

18. See Dworkin, Assisted Suicide, supra note 17, at 40-44.
19. ld. at 42. Dworkin also wrote:
The main moral claims of that brief were, first, that competent dying individuals have,
in principle, a right to decide for themselves how to die, and, second, that even if
recognizing that right would to some degree increase the risk that other patients would
be pressured into choosing death against their will, that increased risk does not justify
refusing to recognize the right at all.
Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, supra note 17, at 1729; see Dworkin, Assisted Suicide, supra
note 17, at 41-47. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Fifth Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture,
November 22, 1996: Euthanasia, Morality, and the Law, Transcript,31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1147
(1998). According to Dworkin, "None of the Justices 'ducked' both of these claims; three of
them decided against [his] position on the first and five on the second." Dworkin, Darwin's
New Bulldog, supra note 17, at 1729. See Ronald Dworkin, Orderof the Coif Lecture: Reply, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 431 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: An Exchange,
N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 6, 1997, at 68-69 (replying to Yale Kamisar) [hereinafter Dworkin, An
Exchange].
20. See Dworkin, An Exchange, supra note 19, at 69.
21. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 133,
227 (1999).
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constitutional role of courts in such ethical controversies. 22 In
contrast, Posner is adamant that the Supreme Court must deliberately
and steadfastly refuse to become bogged down in such philosophical
quagmires. 23 His pragmatic commitments advise that courts best
fulfill their institutional roles when they "ground policy judgments on
facts and consequences [rather] than on conceptualisms and
generalities. ' '24 Accordingly, in Glucksberg, the Supreme Court was
correct to stay out of the moral debate around the right to die and to
prefer the solid earth of policy analysis to the soggy turf of moral
philosophy-there was no obviously shared or objective moral
resolution available; democracy was at work and seemed to be
proceeding satisfactorily without judicial interference, and the issue
demanded very complex rules of implementation which courts are illequipped to draft. In advocating such a consequentialist approach to
decision making, Posner it seems does not intend to abandon
principled adjudication in favor of ad hoc calculation. Posner claims
that it is simply mistaken to equate "moral principle to principle, and
morality to normativity." 25 For Posner, therefore, Glucksberg is a
prime example of the benefits and legitimacy of construing
constitutional (and general common law) adjudication as a practical
task of institutional instrumentalities rather than as an abstruse
exercise in philosophical reflection: the former is something that most
judges can and should do, whereas, the latter is something that most
judges cannot and should not do.
While the spat between Dworkin and Posner goes to the
contemporary heart of much jurisprudential debate, there is another
take on the Glucksberg decision that is worthy of serious
consideration. It is Francis J. Mootz's suggestion that Justice Souter's
judgment ought to be celebrated as a paradigm example of what it
means to take a sophisticated and Gadamerian-inspired approach to
the judicial task. 26 Mootz states that, "[Justice] Souter's opinion
22 Id. at 133.
23. Id. at 130-34.
24. Id. at 227.
25. Id. at 133. For a critique of this approach, see Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, supra
note 17. Justice Souter has also been taken to task for his inability to justify the exclusion of
economic liberties from substantive due process doctrine. See Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment,
and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslationof the Due Process Clause, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 44-45, 52-53 (1999). For other critiques, see Bruce Jennings, The
Liberal Neutrality of Living and Dying: Bioethics, Constitutional Law, and Political Theory in
the American Right-to-Die Debate, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 97 (1999); Symposium
on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 109 ETHIcS 497 (1999).
26. See generally Francis J. Mootz III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
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persuasively describes the adjudication of fundamental rights as a
hermeneutical-rhetorical project in terms that Gadamer ... would

endorse, even though Justice Souter articulates his reasoning in the
idiom of contemporary constitutional discourse. '2 7
Moreover, Mootz maintains that Justice Souter's legal pragmatism taps into the natural law tradition, albeit in a nontraditional
and new form. At the heart of Justice Souter's approach is alleged to
be not only the outright denial of adjudication as a technical and
pseudoscientific exercise in textual exegesis, but also an enthusiastic
embrace of the hermeneutical idea that adjudication involves
immersion in an organic tradition of reasoned judgment and
principled argumentation in which a balanced mediation of past
commitments and present concerns is negotiated. Inspired by the
work of Lon Fuller and Lloyd Weinreb, Mootz puts together a
plausible case for his informed assessment that "[Justice] Souter's
practice affirms that rhetorical knowledge is possible and that human
understanding is dialogical ' '28 and that "this mode of conversational
understanding acknowledges the natural law groundings of legal
practice while simultaneously rendering the law current by means of
application and judgment. '' 29 Accordingly, Justice Souter's opinion
warrants a close and critical reappraisal in light of these ambitious
claims.
Nevertheless, although Justice Souter's judgment and its
thoughtful reflection on adjudicative legitimacy are a vast
improvement on the other judicial approaches on offer, I do not
believe that it can bear the jurisprudential weight that hermeneutical
jurists like Mootz wish to place on it. As with my treatment of
Gadamer and legal hermeneutics generally, I intend to take the basic
claims that Justice Souter makes and, rather than hedge on their
radical import as Gadamer, Mootz, and Justice Souter do, push
through on them in an unconditional and uncompromising manner.
When this is done, Mootz and Justice Souter appear quite
conservative in that they are shown to be unwilling to take seriously
the radical implications of their own views. However, my quarrel
with Justice Souter and Mootz is less with how they depict the
operation of the common law, but more with the claims that they
Argumentation,and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1999).
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id. at 381.
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make for this account. Indeed, while I agree in large part with their
description of the common law method, I disagree that this
hermeneutical method can live up to the traditional expectations that
are placed upon it; it fails to deliver on the formalist promise that
common law adjudication is a bounded and objective process that can
give rise to relatively determinate and predictable resolutions of
disputed controversies in a way that distinguishes legal decision
making from overtly political or ideological disputation. Consequently, rather than offer a compelling illustration of Gadamerianinspired legal argumentation, Justice Souter's judgment actually gives
credence to the alternative hermeneutical account of the common law
that I intend to propose-there is no method that can absolve people
from the responsibility and challenge of constantly arguing what
should and should not be done in particular contexts at particular
times and there is no escaping politics to a technical or sanitized
conversation in which the basic struggle over whose interests count
and what they count for can be sidestepped. Of course, such a debate
will itself be ungrounded and political: there is no way to talk about
politics that is not itself political. Politics, like the law in which it
plays itself out, is a work-in-progress. In short, I maintain that "law is
politics" in that, far from being a check on or remove from political
debate, adjudication is another site, albeit stylized and technical, for
political confrontation in which "anything might go."
III. THE SOUTER MOVE

In writing for the majority in the Glucksberg opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist relies on a fairly predictable approach to the
substantive due process doctrine. 30 While he accepts that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty" is broader than a
mere absence of physical restraint, he insists that the limits of such
fundamental values must be studiously noted and observed. 31 In
order to ensure that there is a requisite degree of objectivity to the
recognition of such values, Rehnquist demands that only those values
that are deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions can be
accorded constitutional sanction. 32 Accordingly, he holds that,
30. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-37 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
31. Id. at 719-20 ("The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.") (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 530 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
32 Id. at 720-21 ("Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
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because "for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law
tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and
assisting suicide,"' 3 there is no legitimate ground on which to
recognize a protected right to assisted suicide.3 4 Indeed, Rehnquist is
so opposed to a balancing of competing interests that he is prepared
to concede that there might not be any "principled basis" for defining
the actual reach and extent of the fundamental rights that are
protected. 35 For him, the vaunted objectivity of the traditional
process outweighs any perceived gains to be made by a more
nuanced, yet less neutral, approach to substantive due process. 36 In
going out of his way to defend the traditional analysis, the Chief
Justice clearly and expressly has the alternative method of Justice
Souter in his jurisprudential sights.37 In contrast, Souter's approach to
the substantive due process doctrine is much less as a historicist and
more critical than Rehnquist's. He is not prepared to treat what is
historically rooted as being constitutionally decisive; while the
embeddedness and longevity of a particular social practice is an
important factor in determining its constitutional protection, it is not
the exclusive or necessarily decisive one.38
Justice Souter offers a plausible telling of the doctrine in which
the absolutism of Dred Scott v. Sandford 9 and Lochner v. New York 4°
has given way to a more restrained approach that favors legislative
intervention and curbs only arbitrary and egregious exercises of that
power. For Souter, this entails the "scrutiny of a legislative resolution
(perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly
worthy in and of itself, but each to be weighed within the history of

protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."') (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502
(1977)).
33. Id. at 711.
34. Id. at 719.
35. Id. at 785. Justice Souter wrote in the concurring opinion:
The case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here, not because recognizing one
due process right would leave a court with no principled basis to avoid recognizing
another, but because there is a plausible case that the right claimed would not be
readily containable by reference to facts about the mind that are matters of difficult
judgment, or by gatekeepers who are subject to temptation, noble or not.
Id.
36. Id. at 721.
37. Id. at 721 n.17 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
38. Id. at 756, 761.
39. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
40. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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our values as a people. ' 41 Rather than a logical deduction from some
textual first premise, Souter treats the doctrine as demanding "a
comparison of the relative strengths of opposing claims, ' '42 that
empowers the courts not to "substitute one reasonable resolution of
the contending positions for another, but... to supplant the balance
already struck between the contenders only when it falls outside the
realm of the reasonable."'43 The judicial challenge is to avoid "the
absolutist failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite
pole of equating reasonableness with past practice described at a very
specific level."" To achieve this, Souter draws upon the idea of
"ordered liberty" that consists of a continuum of rights to be free
from "arbitrary impositions or purposeless restraints.

'45

As the

source for the legitimacy of this balancing approach to substantive
due process analysis, Souter points to the celebrated dissent of Justice
Harlan in Poe v. Ullman,46 in which he states:

Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can
be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which
it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court, which radically
departs from it, could not long survive, while a decision which
builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula
could
serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.47
41. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 765.
45. Id. at 752.
46. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
47. Id. at 765-66 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)). Glucksberg is not the
first time that Justice Souter has taken such an approach to substantive due process. He began
to develop his "reasoned judgment" line in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
However, in speaking for the Court, along with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, Justice Souter
made a couple of remarks that strike a discordant note. First, he said that "consistent with other
constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of
offering a justification. But courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw." Id. at 870.
This can only make sense in those areas where constitutional liberties are not at stake. Second,
he observed that "even when jurists reason from shared premises, some disagreement is
inevitable. That is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which must
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There are many motifs in these famous dicta-no formulaic
solutions, the balancing of interests, a rational process, the caution
against roaming judges, the lessons of history, the force of tradition,
the organic quality of tradition, and restrained judgment-that Souter
seeks to draw together into an integrated and dynamic account of
what substantive due process analysis demands and has become.
Justice Souter, however, is much more ambitious in the claims that he
makes for this style of judicial practice. In stressing that "[t]his
approach calls for a court to assess the relative 'weights' or dignities
of the contending interests, ' 48 he underlines the fact that "[this]
judicial method is familiar to the common law."49 This, of course, is
not surprising. Indeed, it would be odd if the difference between the
styles of constitutional and common law adjudication were substantial
or striking, as it is exactly the same judges that engage in both.
Nevertheless, Souter is quick to point out that there are two
important constraints in constitutional matters, particularly when
undertaking substantive due process review. First, there must be
some objective basis to the values protected that go beyond the
"merely personal and private notions"50 of justice of any particular
judge. Second, having identified the existence of fundamental values,
it must be determined whether "the legislation's justifying principle,
critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the
individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the
statute must give way."51 It is not enough to simply locate "a
reasonable resolution of contending values that differs from the terms
of the legislation under review. 5' 2 Notwithstanding these riders,
Souter is clear and open that he believes that substantive due process
analysis is simply a particular kind of common law adjudication: the
basic components of the common law mindset are adapted to the
specialized demands of the constitutional context. 3
In undertaking this general adjudicative task, Souter urges there
has to be an "explicit attention to detail that is no less essential to the
intellectual discipline of substantive due process review than an
understanding of the basic need to account for the two sides in the
accommodate life's complexity." Id. at 878. This seems to be right, but undermines severely the
confidence that Souter has in "exact" analysis.
4& Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 768.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 767.
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controversy and to respect legislation within the zone of reasonableness."54 Again, drawing on Harlan's dissenting opinion, Souter
observes that:
Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to the
selections of statements of the competing interests, the acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons for the
selections made. It is here that the value of common-law method
becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of the common law is
suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal
petrification instead of an evolving boundary between the domains
of old principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect
instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new
examples and new counterexamples. The "tradition is a living
thing," albeit one that moves by moderate steps carefully taken.
"The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on
grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and
criteria. The new decision must take its place in relation to what
went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come." Exact
analysis and characterization of any due process claim is critical to
the method and to the result.55
Having laid out what he believes to be the best and most
appropriate approach to substantive due process analysis in particular
and common law adjudication in general, Justice Souter turns to the
resolution of the concrete dispute before the Supreme Court. In line
with his defended approach, he asks whether, as part of the
traditionally recognized claims to autonomy in deciding how human
bodies and minds should be treated, a patient's request to obtain the
services of a physician in committing suicide "is said to enjoy a
tradition so strong and so devoid of specifically countervailing state
concern that denial of a physician's help in these circumstances is
arbitrary when physicians are generally free to advise and aid those
who exercise other rights to bodily autonomy."56 After engaging in a
close and contextual survey of the law, practices, and arguments in
play, Justice Souter concludes that, although the importance of the
individual interests are substantial,
[wihether that interest might in some circumstances, or at some
time, be seen as "fundamental" to the degree entitled to prevail is
not, however, a conclusion that I need draw here, for I am satisfied

54. Id. at 765.
55. Id. at 770. In reaching this decision, Souter seems to be following very closely the
advice offered by Cass Sunstein on how to decide the issue. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to
Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123 (1997). Souter does not mention Sunstein in his judgment.
56. Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 774.
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that the State's interests ...are sufficiently serious57 to defeat the
present claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless.
In reaching this conclusion, Souter accepts the practical difficulties in
controlling or limiting the exercise of the alleged right. Indeed, he is
very concerned to ensure that the courts do not step on the toes of
legislatures who have a much greater claim to the open floor of
political dancing and are authorized to take the choreographic lead in
deciding what is the style and direction of political movement. When
it comes to recognizing the existence and scope of the unenumerated
rights of the Due Process Clause, it will not be arbitrary for the
legislature to act when the "facts necessary to resolve the controversy
are not readily ascertainable through the judicial process; but they are
more readily subject to discovery through legislative factfinding and
experimentation '1 8 and to answer otherwise "would simply create a
constitutional regime too uncertain to bring with it the expectation of
finality that is one of this Court's central obligations in making
constitutional decisions."5 9 Nevertheless, in line with the contextually
nuanced imperative of Harlan's favored methodology, Justice Souter
concludes that "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim
should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional
'60
competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this time.
In many ways, Justice Souter's judgment is a jurisprudential tour
de force; he takes the opportunity presented by the particular dispute
to offer a reflective and expansive general justification of adjudicative
responsibilities in a constitutional democracy. As such, Souter
attempts to provide little less than a comprehensive theory of
common law decision making that, in its emphasis on attention to
detail, historical erudition, conceptual flexibility, and critical insight,
is as ambitious as it is sophisticated. It is not surprising, therefore,
that his judgment-not for the jurisprudentially timid at heartshould have received such critical attention and lively debate. While
there is much to comment on Souter's judgment (and its general
57. Id. at 782.
58. Id. at 785-87.
59. Id. at 789.
60. Id. While Justice Souter traces the idea of "reasoned judgment" to the dissenting
judgment of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961), it has been remarked
that, while Harlan talks about reason and judgment, he does not mention "reasoned judgment"
as such. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying
Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673 (2000). Also, although Justice Souter took a similar pragmatic
approach to substantive due process analysis in his majority opinion in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), it was chastised by Justice Scalia for being overly subjective and
having been rejected by the Court in Glucksberg. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 860-61.
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jurisprudential reception), I will restrict my response to an effort to
treat it as an exemplary illustration of philosophical practice in the
mode of Gadamerian hermeneutics. That having been said, such a
response will touch upon a wide range of theoretical issues and
practical controversies. Accordingly, as part of that critique, I will
utilize Souter's sophisticated opinion as a convenient route into three
of the central problems that define and dog contemporary jurisprudence: (1) that there is some objective basis to the protected
values and the methods used to ascertain them that goes beyond the
"merely personal and private notions" 61 of justice of any particular
judge; (2) that it is possible for judges to identify "arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints" 62 by legislative bodies in a
strictly legal as opposed to openly political way; and (3) that there
exist recognizable traditions in law which allow judges to engage in
contested matters of social, legal, and judicial practices in a determinate and defensible way. Or, to put it more bluntly, that there is a
viable way of resisting the critical claim that "law is politics." I will
begin this task of insisting that there is no viable way to so resist by
stepping back and exploring the contemporary relation between
jurisprudence and hermeneutics.
IV. THE HERMENEUTICAL INSIGHT
As traditionally understood, jurisprudence applies to all those
efforts to step back from the actual practice and operation of law in
order to make some general sense of it all. As Karl Llewellyn
phrased it, "jurisprudence is as big as law, and bigger. '63 This venture
can be carried out from all perspectives and indeed has been.
Economists, sociologists, literary critics, anthropologists, political
scientists, psychologists, and many others have sought to place the
world of law under closer critical scrutiny. However, in recent years,
jurisprudence has been hijacked by philosophers. Apart from their
usual imperialist claims that philosophy is the intellectual discipline
that is assumed and incorporated by all others, legal philosophers
claim to be first among jurisprudential equals. They insist that, while
there is much of value to be learned about law when viewed from the
outside as a social or political activity, the effort to understand law in
its own terms and as a viable internal operation is entitled to
61. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767.
62. Id. at 790 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)).
63. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 372 (1962).
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theoretical priority. It is not so much that they dismiss other types of
study, but that they claim that they are of a secondary and derivative
character for lawyers. While such jurists concede that not all
problems and issues in law are philosophical, they do contend that all
of those problems and issues are capable of becoming philosophical
ones and that they are premised on some inescapable philosophical
assumptions. Construed in this way, jurisprudence soon found itself
on the familiar terrain of many traditional philosophical conundrums,
and jurists have considered a central part of the jurisprudential
project to develop an epistemology of law: How is it possible to have
knowledge about law or to know what counts as knowledge Of or
about law? And what counts as good and bad knowledge about law?
As such, jurisprudence has adopted a traditional and philosophical
stance in developing a series of truth claims about the legal enterprise. All of the problems of legal philosophy or jurisprudence have
tended to begin and, in some cases, to end with this inquiry: "Most of
the important arguments in legal thought are epistemological in
nature."64
However, as jurisprudence has become increasingly philosophical in style and ambition, the discipline of philosophy has been
experiencing a certain crisis of confidence in its own status and
performance: there is widespread uncertainty over the academic
viability and intellectual legitimacy of the whole philosophical
enterprise, especially in its epistemological mode. Recent debates
have moved beyond traditional exchanges over the merits of one
theory of truth or another and, instead, have begun to focus upon the
very idea and possibility of truth itself. There is a growing insistence
that the traditional theoretical effort to distinguish between "what the
world seems like to us" and "what the world really is" and whether
such a distinction will pay practical dividends must be abandoned.
There is no worthwhile or sustainable distinction between what is
thought to be the case about the world and what is the case about the
world, between what seems to be right and what is right, and between
what is believed about the world and the way the world really is.
Despite philosophers' and jurists' best efforts, they have been
thwarted in their attempts to demonstrate that there is some critical
distance between the world and our thoughts about it such that the
world cannot only be what people think it is. Under this critical
64. James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 779 (1985).
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anxiety, to say something true and objective about the world is to do
no more than report on what people presently believe or accept to be
true and objective about the world. This is not to deny that there is a
reality or to fall into some absurdly solipsistic understanding of the
world; it is simply to accept that there is no way of stepping outside
our perceptions about the world to determine whether those
perceptions correspond with what is really the case. The critical idea
is that a theory of truth is a theory of meaning and no more; it is
offered as "an explanation of what people do, rather than of a noncausal, representing, relation in which they stand to non-human
entities. '65 There is no truth about what is really there over and
above what are treated as the best prevailing beliefs about what is
really there. And what is best is whatever has managed to get itself
accepted in the relevant community of inquiry.
Accordingly, spreading through the academic community at
large, there is a growing lack of faith in the capacity of scholars to live
up to the expectations that they have created in reason being able to
confront power and to deliver general truths that can ground specific
efforts at human improvement. 66 Although this critique has come
from several quarters, a major source of this challenge has been the
field of hermeneutics. 67 Scholars have begun to take seriously the
idea that truth is beholden to the discursive regimes through which it
is apprehended and validated. 68 Concepts such as truth, coherence,
and objectivity, it is suggested, are best understood as internal to
historical debate over theory and not as some external set of
discursive categories available to validate any such debate. 69 As such,
theorizing does not become an attempted escape to some esteemed
realm of pure thinking, but rather an engaged effort to understand
the social entanglement and linguistic situation of thinking itself. In
advocating a shift from epistemological truth to rhetorical knowledge,
this hermeneutical critique of the traditional philosophical enterprise
has been developed and expressed in many different ways.
Nevertheless, a central division between these critics is the extent and
force of the hermeneutical insight. Having set in motion a powerful
antidote to traditional thinking, is it possible to contain it such that it
65. RICHARD RORTY, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
151, 154 (1991).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1015

does not impugn and invalidate the whole theoretical exercise? This
is because, in its more extreme form, the charge is that, under the
tutelage of a postmodern sensibility, philosophy has become a
pasquinade of itself in which reason is reduced to customary ways of
thinking, truth has become opinion, and objectivity is no more than
70
consensus.
In jurisprudence, this diffidence has caused jurists to question not
only the truth of legal nature and its objective ascertainment but the
nature of truth and objectivity themselves. With little enthusiasm and
considerable reluctance, jurists have been obliged to shelve their
' 71
traditional efforts to engage in "a continuing dialogue with reality
and, instead, to interrogate the operative notions of dialogue, reality
and, as importantly, their relation. 72 Indeed, because the stakes are
relatively high, jurisprudence has become one of the important
battlegrounds for this theoretical war. Predictably, its waging has
been particularly hostile. This combative encounter has taken place
on the site of the common law. By this, I mean that jurists have
locked philosophical horns over the nature of law in a system in which
responsibility for its ascertainment and development, even in matters
of constitutional doctrine, is entrusted to judicial officials. As such,
the adjudicative function has become the main focus of jurisprudential energies and its legitimacy has become its main problem.
In a social world in which legal adjudication is increasingly asked to
wrestle with and resolve some of the most morally contentious and
politically fraught issues of the day, it is considered as important as it
has ever been that law is able to claim an institutional and intellectual
authority for itself that will be respected by the competing moral and
political factions: there must be something objective and neutral
about adjudication and law that sets it apart, however slightly, from
the partisan conditions of moral and political debate. And the central
question for contemporary jurisprudence is whether this traditional
project of mainstream theorizing can withstand the corrosive
implications of the hermeneutical insight.
Against this backdrop, it can easily be appreciated why the

70. See FELIPE FERNANDEz-ARMESTO, TRUTH: A HISTORY AND A GUIDE FOR THE

PERPLEXED 120-29 (1997).
71. Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1193 (1981).
72. Id. at 1193-95. This sense of crisis is periodic and seems to occur on a generational
basis. For an earlier effort to assess the last crisis, see Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 199-201 (1984).
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broad-based challenge to philosophy has been such a threat to the
jurisprudential project. Deprived of a philosophical recourse to the
reassuring epistemological terrain of objective truths, mainstream
jurists have been obliged to reassess their whole intellectual strategy.
The response has been predictably varied-some have imitated the
camel and stuck their heads deeper in the philosophical sand; some
have redoubled their epistemological efforts and defended the
philosophical establishment against the hermeneutical menace; others
have seized the opportunity to utilize the hermeneutical insight as
further grist for the nihilistic mill; and still others have actually taken
the hermeneutical insight seriously. These are each interesting
responses and reveal much about the state of law and jurisprudence;
they each deserve a full and sustained treatment.7 3 However, in this
Article, I will be concentrating on only one kind of reaction. I want
to explore the response that claims to have taken the hermeneutical
insight seriously and attempted to develop a jurisprudential account
of law and adjudication that places it at the center of its efforts.
These jurists do not shun or shudder at the implications of the
hermeneutical insight, but embrace it as providing an exciting
opportunity to place the adjudicative and jurisprudential enterprises
on a much more secure and defensible footing. While there are
obvious differences and emphases among these hermeneutical
converts, they are united in their conviction that hermeneutics
demonstrates that it is no longer tenable to view the common law as a
static source of institutional norms.
Rather than represent law as an entity and adjudication as a
science, these hermeneutical jurists are adamant that the common law
is as much a process or practice as anything else-it is an argumentative tradition which can not only balance the competing demands of
stability and change, but can also do so in a way that respects the
important distinction between law and politics. Although many
would not go so far as to assert that "law is something we do, not
something we have as a consequence of something we do, 7 4 there is a
general acceptance that the depiction of the common law as a vital
practice of lawmaking is as important as the body of legal decisions
that it produces. For them, the hermeneutical claim that rhetorical
knowledge must replace epistemological truth as the touchstone of

73. For an initial attempt to map and criticize these approaches, see Allan C. Hutchinson,
Casaubon'sGhosts: The Haunting of Legal Scholarship, 21 LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming 2000).
74.

PHILIP BOBBITf, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1991).
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valid theorizing is the making, not the breaking, of the jurisprudential
project. Although Justice Souter might never have heard of, let alone
read Gadamer, his opinion in Glucksberg is seen as not only the best
example of such a pragmatic approach to law and adjudication, but
also as a passable defense of the propriety of so proceeding. Like
Molire's Monsieur Jourdain, he might be forgiven for exclaiming
"Parma foil II y a plus quaranteans que je dis de Gadamer sans que
j'en susse rien."I' It is to an introduction of Gadamerian hermeneutics
that I now turn.
V. TRUTHS AND METHODS
Who can disagree with the advice to "say what you mean and
mean what you say"? Whether proffered by way of admonition or
encouragement, it is sterling counsel. Everyone would do well to
aspire to such transparency and to efface the space between his or her
words and thoughts in which confusion and misunderstanding can
take hold. Yet, as almost everyone has to concede at some time or
In short, the
other, the ambition can be frustratingly elusive.
what
you say" is
mean
and
mean
encouragement to "say what you
quite deceptively simple and quite simply deceptive -the effort to pin
down language so that its intended meaning shines pellucidly through,
is forever fixed, and is transported undistorted to the minds of others
is both a worthy goal and an impossible achievement. It is not only
that there is an ineradicable gap between ideas and utterance, it is
that each seems to inhabit the other so thoroughly that one does not
stand prior to or independent from the other: ideas and words are, if
not entirely reducible to each other, so intertwined that any attempt
to concentrate on one without the other is destined to result in less,
not more understanding. All of this would be difficult enough if such
efforts took place in immediate, face-to-face encounters in a static
world, but they become even more fraught when it is remembered
that they occur in a world that is constantly on the move. This means
that intentions, words, meanings, and ideas begin to slip and slide. As
communication is a social practice, efforts to "say what you mean and
mean what you say" are held hostage to the social and political forces
that are in play as history moves onwards. In a manner of speaking,
because history never sleeps, "you," "say," and "mean" are always
75. JEAN-BAPTISTE POQUELIN (MOLIPRE), LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME act 2, sc. 4, at
163-64 (Yves Hucher ed., Librarie Larousse 1989) (1670) (the traditional translation is "Good
Heavens! For more than 40 years I have been speaking Gadamer (prose) without knowing it.").
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works-in-progress such that attempts to treat them as finished or
finishable are misguided and misleading.
This, of course, is where hermeneutics enters the picture. While
the difficulty of expressing oneself with clarity and certainty is a stiff
enough challenge, talking about hermeneutics is a doubly difficult
endeavour. As an area of study that might broadly be understood as
being concerned with the principles of (once specifically Biblical, now
generally textual) interpretation, there is the delicious and frustrating
problem of interpreting the meaning of work that is itself about the
task of interpreting meaning. However, the self-referential and
subversive dimension of this challenge is too often ignored or elided
by many of those working in the field. Indeed, in law and jurisprudence, it is frequently ignored altogether: jurists continue
unabashed in their insistence upon interpreting hermeneutical texts in
the most unsubtle and simplistic ways. Scholarship that seeks to
disturb traditional attitudes and approaches to texts as repositories of
the authors' meaning waiting to be disclosed is read and received
(and, it must be added, is often written and defended) in the most
traditional of ways. In arguing for greater openness and indeterminacy in interpreting texts, such work is addressed as if it itself had a
closed and determinate meaning to be revealed: any fuzziness or
imprecision is counted as a mark against it. Of course, this is not to
suggest that there ought not to be a premium on scholarship that is
accessible, understandable, and lucid. But it is surely inappropriate to
expect that a piece of scholarship that argues for the instability and
work-in-progressness of language and communication will itself not
be subject to those very forces that it illuminates and emphasizes.
Accordingly, in entering the field of hermeneutical scholarship, a
certain willingness to put in play one's basic ideas about language and
meaning seems to be a necessary price of admission. Unfortunately,
too many see this less as an inexpensive opportunity for
enlightenment and more as a costly toll on clear thinking. To my
mind, this begrudging and frankly insecure way of proceeding is
especially evident in the jurisprudential reception given to the
writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Rather than recognizing the
nontraditional and critical thrust of his work, jurists contrive to
interpret and utilize him in the most traditional and uncritical fashion.
Nevertheless, whatever might be made of Gadamer's writings
and ideas, it seems to be almost universally accepted that his work has
a central place in the extant canon of hermeneutical writings. Writing
in midcentury, he set himself the daunting task of confronting the
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imposing German tradition of hermeneutical scholarship and of
wresting it from the suffocating grip of its metaphysical mindset.
Much of his argumentation is devoted to engaging with central ideas
and thinkers in the German tradition, especially Wilhelm Dilthey,
Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl and Martin
Heidegger and latterly, Jirgen Habermas. 76 Gadamer's basic
objective is to demonstrate that scientific method is neither the
controlling, nor even a helpful model for hermeneutical understanding. He does not offer a competing metric for hermeneutical
understanding that can direct or control in the same way as the
reputed scientific method, but insists that "[hlermeneutics is an art
and not a mechanical process. 7 7 Instead of trying to construct a
critical rationality that will do service in the humanities in the same
way and to the same effect as in the sciences, 78 his work is presented
as more a methodical corrective than a correct method in which
"[p]erhaps there is, properly speaking, no method, but rather a
certain way of acting. ' 79 Although his work is obscure in parts and
highly philosophical in scope, Gadamer's ideas are (or, at least,
should be) of particular interest to jurists and lawyers. Rather than
treating the problems of legal interpretation as secondary or
exceptional aspects of the hermeneutical enterprise, he places the
interpretive problems of jurisprudence squarely at the heart of his
own hermeneutical project: "[L]egal hermeneutics is no special case
but is, on the contrary, capable of restoring the hermeneutical
problem to its full breadth" 80 and the "texts... [of law] are the
preferred objects of hermeneutics... [because they] present the
problem of awakening a meaning petrified in letters from the letters
themselves." 81 Accordingly, Gadamer's approach to law promises to
be as stimulating and challenging as it is suggestive and disturbing.
76. See GADAMER, supra note 2, at xxxv-xxxvii, 545-46, 566.
77. Id. at 191.
78. Recent scholarship has cast considerable doubt on whether science is as scientific as is
traditionally understood: the methodological contrast between science and the humanities is less
stark and more subtle than many traditional thinkers, including Gadamer, allow. See generally
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); RICHARD RORTY,

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999). Nevertheless, I do not believe that this is particularly
damaging to Gadamer's claims about the hermeneutical project. Although it might undercut his
rhetorical contrast with the supposed certainty and mechanicalness of the scientific method, it
does not reduce the force or cogency of his general ideas. For similar overstatements about the
reach and objectivity of (social) science, see POSNER, supra note 21, at 206-26.
79. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 26.
80. Id. at 328.
81. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Semantics and Hermeneutics (1972), in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS 82, 90 (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976).
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For Gadamer, language is the key to a proper understanding of
the human predicament and condition. Arguing that "language
speaks us, rather than we speak it, ' '82 Gadamer maintains that
"language and thinking about things are so bound together" 83 that it is
impossible to conceive of one without the other or to imagine that
language is a "pre-given system of possibilities of being for which the
signifying subject selects corresponding signs." 84 Although Gadamer
commits himself to such a boldly discursive understanding of the
human situation, he does not fall back into the stifling embrace of a
metaphysical approach that views language as the fixed or stable
grounding for human knowledge. Instead, he allies this basic insight
to an equally important commitment to "the historical movement
of... things. '85 For Gadamer, language is a socially situated practice
that can never escape entirely the historical confines of its usage
either as an originating act or an interpretive apprehension. When
this attachment to both language as the fundamental medium of
human existence and historical contingency as a compelling feature of
human existence are grasped in their general force and detailed
operation, it becomes clear that Gadamer's account of the hermeneutical process is very different than the traditional one. Emphasizing the dynamic quality of both text and interpretation, Gadamer
adopts an approach that is both dialogic and dialectical-it is dialogic
in that it involves an active engagement between text and reader, and
it is dialectical in that it demands a vigorous interplay between past
and present: hermeneutics is in the job of "bridging of personal or
86
historical distance between minds."
As such, the effort to achieve hermeneutical understanding is not
a passive reflection on a completed object, but is "an encounter with
an unfinished event and is itself part of this event. '87 Consequently,
there is no completed object of interpretation that is waiting to be
discovered or revealed in its wholeness, but only the invitation to
engage and play with it in the hope that meaning will be forged in that
encounter. Accordingly, "understanding is to be thought of less as a
subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process

82. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 463.
83. Id. at 417.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 285.
86. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Aesthetics and Hermeneutics (1964), in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 81, at 95, 95.
87. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 99.
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of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated."88
Indeed, performance is not peripheral or secondary to the text, but it
is "essential" 9 to any genuine attempt to understand the text's
meaning; "every performance is an event, but not one in any way
separate from the work-the work itself is what 'takes place'.., in
the event.., of performance." 90 In the same way that "reading music
is [not] the same as listening to it,"91 so reflecting on law is not the
same as applying it. Moreover, when this dynamic is properly
understood, it will be appreciated that the occasion and site for its
performance will become highly unstable and political in that the
values and commitments that frame the interpretive act-what
Gadamer calls "prejudices"-can never be ignored or disregarded.
The task of the interpreter, as opposed to the prophet or proselytizer,
is to gain some critical distance from one's own prejudices, not so that
they can be left behind as "there is undoubtedly no understanding
that is free of all prejudices," 92 but so that they can be understood and
recognized. However, consistent with his general hermeneutical
schema, Gadamer emphasizes that there is no algorithm to
"distinguish the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the
false ones, by which we misunderstand..,. so that the text, as
another's meaning, can be isolated and valued on its own,": 93 the best
that can be done is to "guard against over hastily assimilating the past
to our own expectations of meaning" 94 and "arbitrary fancies." 95 For
Gadamer, therefore, it is a constant struggle to identify those "foreconceptions" or prejudices so that interpretation does not become
enslaved to "the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to
what speaks to us in the tradition. 9 6 For Gadamer, therefore, this
contextualized awareness will result in a shift in focus from technique
and reflection to participation and engagement in which "[f]rom the
hermeneutical standpoint, rightly understood, it is absolutely absurd
to regard the concrete factors of work and politics as outside the
scope of hermeneutics." 97 This hermeneutical performance functions
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 290.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 147 (internal parenthetical information omitted).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 270.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection
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as a kind of play in the sense of a "to-and-fro movement that is not
tied to any goal that would bring it to an end ...; rather, it renews
itself in constant repetition.""8 When understood in terms of legal
interpretation where application is front and center, this playful
encounter ensures that "[the] gap [between the text and its
application] can never be completely closed" 99 and works to establish
"a certain area of free-play"' ° which "always and necessarily breaks
' 1 Indeed, for Gadamer,
off in an open indeterminacy."10
it is "thanks
precisely to its open indeterminacy [that law] is able to produce
constant new invention from within itself."102 In fulfilling their central
task of deciding cases, judges must understand that there is not a twostep process of first understanding and then application; the latter is
part of the former because we cannot understand in the abstract or
general, but only in concrete and particular situations. Consequently,
"judging the case involves not merely applying the universal principle
according to which it is judged, but co-determining, supplementing,
and correcting that principle" 10 3 such that a "text must be understood
at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different
way."'1' 4 In this way, Gadamer drives home his fundamental hermeneutical point that "the law is always deficient, not because it is
imperfect in itself but because human reality is necessarily imperfect
in comparison to the ordered world of law, and hence allows of no
simple application of the law."' 15 Law and adjudication are both
made possible and made problematic by the normative dimension of
interpretation; the common law gains its constancy and growth from
the same source of interpretive performance.
An important corollary of Gadamer's general theoretical
position is that he has little truck with any metaphysical claims to the
dominant authority of authorial intention in the hermeneutical
engagement. It follows from his general orientation that "[e]very age
(1967), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 81, at 18,31.
98. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 103. While the notion of "play" is a significant component
in a full understanding of Gadamer's hermeneutical approach, I do not intend to deal with it at
extended length. This is not because I do not believe it to be worthy of deeper consideration
and critique, but because I have already offered my own extended reflection on "play." See
HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 162-79.
99. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 384.
100. Id. at 519.
101. Id. at 340.
102. Id. at 498.
103. Id. at 39.
104. Id. at 309.
105. Id. at 318.
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has to understand a transmitted text in its own way."1 °6 A text's
meaning does not depend on the contingent situation of authors and
their original audiences because those contingencies must themselves
always be open to interpretation by the text's subsequent readers.
Constituted in a dynamic context and reconstituted in an equally
dynamic, but different context, "the meaning of a text goes beyond its
author... [and t]hat is why understanding is not merely a
reproductive but always a productive activity as well."10 7 For
Gadamer, therefore, the passage of time or history is not so much the
enemy of meaning, but its enabling source: "The hermeneutic task
consists in not covering up ... [the tension between the text and the
present] by attempting a naive assimilation of the two but in
consciously bringing it out." 1°8 This being the case, no text can be
created so closed so that the space between "saying" and "meaning"
can be entirely effaced such that there will be no room for future
engagement. Nor can there be a fixed or canonized performance that
Accordingly, while every
demands no future reinterpretation.
interpretation strives to be correct, "in view of the finitude of our
historical existence, it would seem that there is something absurd
about the whole idea of a unique, correct interpretation.' ' 19 In
Gadamer's hermeneutical universe, the work presents and re-presents
itself in its continuing performance such that its meaning will present
itself "so differently in the changing course of ages and
circumstances." 10 When it comes to meaning, Gadamer is adamant
that "in truth, there is nothing that is simply 'there' ... [because
e]verything that is said and is there in the text stands under
anticipations.""'
VI. LOOKING FOR GADAMER

So far, my presentation of the general themes in Gadamer's
work-the importance of historical context and its contingency; the
abandonment of scientific methodology in the humanities; and the
performative dynamism of hermeneutical activity-will hopefully go
largely unchallenged. Perhaps naively in light of the topic, I have
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
(1962),

Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 120-21.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century
in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 81, at 121.
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sought to provide an introduction to Gadamer's ideas that is
sufficiently general to garner broad approval. However, from a
jurisprudential point of view, the subversive effect of such a basic
approach to legal interpretation ought not to be underestimated.
Gadamer has traditional jurists squarely in his sights when he insists
upon the entirely fluid, adamantly nonscientific, thoroughly
contextual, and wholly performative quality of legal hermeneutics.
The claim that valid or worthy legal work can be done in an
exclusively mechanical or technical manner is rendered hopelessly
inadequate. Although technical skills have their role, they can do
little on their own. All interpretation has a social and political aspect
that can only be hidden or ignored, not done away with. In this sense,
"we are all interpretists now"-originalism, textualism, and literalism
are each different and unconvincing ways of denying the interpretist
imperative. Whatever else he may be saying, Gadamer is telling
lawyers that interpretation is an inevitably active and, therefore,
political process; lawyers cannot avoid working with and among the
social forces that both make interpretation possible and problematic.
It is not so much that the instability of those social practices and
forces renders communication impossible, but that it ensures that the
establishment of meaning will never be without difficulty or
uncertainty; the foundations of language and, therefore, law will
always be as contingent and shifting as the foundations of society and
history.
Nevertheless, any attempt to provide a more nuanced and less
sweeping account of Gadamerian hermeneutics and its implications
for jurisprudence soon finds itself in more contested hermeneutical
waters. Beneath the relative calm of the surface, there is a seething
mass of contending hermeneutical forces at work: this is where the
courage and strength of different scholars' hermeneutical convictions
are tested. When it comes to Gadamer's work, the central point of
division is around how far it is possible or desirable to take his critical
insights. Although there are a variety of possible interpretations,
there are two general positions that can be taken. Is it that Gadamer
has loosened the constraints on interpretation and, while forsaking
the idea of a unique interpretation, remained within the gravitational
pull of the metaphysical tradition that holds on to a traditional notion
of hermeneutical truth, albeit more pluralistic and less hegemonic?
Or is it that he has broken open the hermeneutical process to such an
extent that any notions of truth are left in disarray and that, cut free
from the metaphysical tradition, the interpretive process is not so
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much about truth and correctness as usefulness and persuasion? The
pertinence of this division for jurisprudential debate is acute and
obvious. On one side are those who believe that it is still viable to
talk about law and adjudication as separate from broader political
debate: I will call this the conservative approach. On the other side
are those, like myself, who maintain that law and adjudication is one
more site for political debate to take place: I will call this the radical
approach. Again, this radical stance does not mean that "anything
goes"; it recognizes that there are bounds to the hermeneutical
enterprise, but that those bounds are always in play as part of the
larger political game of life.
The most well known exponent of the conservative approach is
Ronald Dworkin. Although his references to Gadamer are few and
far between, it is apparent that his overall hermeneutical approach
owes much to Gadamer's writings. Indeed, Dworkin gladly acknowledges as much when he notes that, in constructing his interpretive
account of law and adjudication, "I appeal to Gadamer, whose
account of interpretation as recognizing, while struggling against, the
constraints of history strikes the right note.' 1 12 While he has some
reservations about whether Gadamer places the interpreter in too
much of a subordinate position to the author and offers too passive
and unidirectional view of the hermeneutical encounter, many of the
central motifs and ideas of Gadamer pervade Dworkin's own
oeuvre.1 13 However, Dworkin relies upon a very conservative reading
of Gadamer.1 14 While Dworkin has done sterling work in demonstrating that adjudication is an inevitably creative and political
undertaking, he insist that judges can still act in a way that is neither
partisan nor unbounded; adjudication is (or ought to be) a principled
affair in which intellectual coherence triumphs over ideological
partiality 15 Dworkinian judges have considerable leeway in their
work, but they are ultimately bound by the "brute facts of legal
history""1 6 and, in placing the legal past in the best political light
possible, they are to operate "on the assumption that [the legal rights
and duties were] created by a single author-the community
personified.""' 7 In this way, Dworkin puts Gadamer to work in the
112. RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 55, 62, 420 (1986).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 225.

For further elaborations of these claims, see RONALD M. DWORKIN,
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central contemporary jurisprudential problem of establishing the
democratic legitimacy of legal adjudication on the basis of its being
both institutionally constrained and politically just.
As such,
Dworkin's theory is the flagship of liberal legalism; it claims to offer a
stable method by which to keep the law up to date and by which to
118
distinguish right from wrong answers.
A less celebrated, but more explicit effort to utilize Gadamer's
work in jurisprudence is that of Francis Jay Mootz III. In a series of
learned and lengthy pieces, he has striven to present a sophisticated
account of legal hermeneutics that plays out in more detail and rigor
the implications of Gadamer's approach for law and adjudication.
The great strength of Mootz's scholarship is that it has familiarized
American theorists with Gadamer's work and has made a forcible
case for its relevance to current problems of legal knowledge and
judicial method; he makes Gadamer's work accessible and useful, but
retains its subtlety and richness. 1 9 For Mootz, Gadamer's major
contribution to jurisprudence is the insistence that law is a rhetorical
practice and that any effort to appreciate adjudication must recognize
the important role that rhetoric plays in fashioning and critiquing
legal knowledge. 20 Nonetheless, although his earlier work retained
the possibility of a more radical reading of Gadamer, his most recent
essays have taken a distinctly conservative turn.'
For all the good
work that Mootz's efforts do, they are overshadowed by his willingness to put them in the service of an epistemological project that still
clings to the possibility of reliable methods and dependable truths.
According to Mootz, while Gadamer has decisively demolished any
possibility for a science of correct interpretation and loosened the
reins of hermeneutical authority, he has not abandoned the hope of
developing a rigorous logic or art of rational interpretation that will
be able to sanction some interpretations as clearly better than others
by stint of its own rhetorical standards."' In making a plea for greater
attention to rhetoric in jurisprudential inquiry, Mootz contends that
"rhetoric is defined not as a grudging resignation from the false hopes
of a rigorous philosophy of truth, nor as a celebration of boundless

FREEDOM'S LAW 1-39 (1996).

118. Id.
119. See Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practiceand Theory, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDiSC. L.J. 491 (1998).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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and playful irrationalism, but instead as a disciplined encounter with
' 123
the activity of rhetorical knowledge.
In a particularly arresting and ambitious essay, Mootz seeks to
stake out and colonize this middle ground between the barren
conceptualism of legal positivism and the excesses of a postmodern
critique. Drawing directly on the work of Gadamer as well as Chaim
Perelman to substantiate the claim that "natural law philosophy and
124
philosophical hermeneutics have significant points of convergence,"'
he proceeds to propose a defense of legal hermeneutics that is
committed to "reinvigorating (even if in dramatically new form) the
natural law tradition."' 125 By this, Mootz intends to portray legal
practice as a hermeneutical conversation that contains the conditions
and resources for its own legitimate elaboration and critique: law is
both a rationally bounded and politically responsive enterprise in
which issues of legal validity and moral acceptability are blended
rather than separated. 26 Picking up where Lon Fuller left off and
Lloyd Weinreb has recently taken up, Mootz leaves little doubt about
the breadth or depth of his intellectual ambitions to construct a fullblown theory of law and justice from the generous quarry of
Gadamer's hermeneutics:
Gadamer's hermeneutical ontology implies a rhetorically based
epistemology, a set of guiding principles by which legal practice can
be assessed and criticized, even if without scientific precision and
determinacy. Gadamer provides the theoretical backing for the
practices that constitute law within flux; not in the sense of
authorizing those practices from a privileged perch of reason, but in
the sense of drawing general conclusions about the contours of
those practices
and describing how those practices may be
127
fostered.
In an important sense, Mootz's "natural law" move should come
as no surprise. After all, Dworkin has been profitably pursuing a
123. Id. at 497. In taking this line, Mootz draws heavily on the work of Gary Madison and
Georgia Warnke. See GARY MADISON, THE HERMENEUTICS OF POSTMODERNITY: FIGURES
AND THEMES (1990); GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND
REASON 79 (1987); GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION (1993); Georgia

Warnke, Law, Hermeneutics and PublicDebate, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395 (1997).
124. Mootz, supra note 26, at 313.
125. Id. at 312.
126. See id. at 312-14.
127. Id. at 378. Other works of Mootz include: Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law
Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1993); Francis J. Mootz III, Law and
Philosophy, Philosophy and Law, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 127 (1994). See also LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); LOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
(1987); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM AND
MORALITY 195 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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similar line for the past two decades. But, apart from the candor and
naivet6 of Mootz's approach, it is the fact that he uses Gadamer as his
primary grounding source that startles. There can be no doubt that
there is ample textual support for this particular conservative reading
of Gadamer; Truth and Method is replete with references and
remarks that give support to such an interpretation. 2 8 Notwithstanding the dynamic and dialogic quality of interpretation, Gadamer
contends that there are occasions on which interpreters will be
"pulled up short by the text": 129 "[T]he important thing is to be aware
of one's own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness
130
and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings.'
Although a perfect legal dogmatic is untenable, legal certainty and
predictability can exist because "it is in principle possible to know
what the exact situation is."'' This is because, according to Gadamer,
the text has a certain "obligatoriness" that ensures that its interpretation cannot be "free and arbitrary,' ' 32 but is "subject to the
supreme criterion of 'right' representation" 133 which enables "the
meaning of the text to assert itself.1' 34 In this sense, Gadamer's own
writings provide textual reassurance to the idea that interpretive
creativity has its limits and they are to be found in the text itself;
"neither the doctrinal authority of the pope nor the appeal to
tradition can obviate the work of hermeneutics, which can safeguard
the reasonable meaning of a text against all impositions."' 35 It is on
these textual resources that Mootz anchors his conservative rendition
of both Gadamer and the jurisprudential project. For all the touted
experimental and inventive possibilities of interpretation, Mootz still
presents legal hermeneutics as a conversational activity in which
deferential interpreters await hermeneutical revelation from textual
authorities: "the interpreter does not adopt a subjective attitude of
dominance over the text, but rather suppresses her subjective aims
and attends to 'the saying' of the historically effective texts as it is
'3 6
revealed in the particular circumstances.'

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See GADAMER, supra note 2.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 118.
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Nevertheless, there is much to applaud in Mootz's account. In
concentrating on the vitality and motility of law as a professional
practice and social phenomenon, he gives cogent voice to the
rejection of "the scientific impulse to reduce law to a disciplined
methodology of deductive application,"' 37 the embrace of "the giveand-take experience of the interpreter within a given historical and
social situation,' 1 38 and the emphasis on "the interpenetration of the
universal and the contextual."' 39 But Mootz cannot or will not resist
the almost overwhelming urge to shackle Gadamerian hermeneutics
to the conservative wagon of mainstream jurisprudence. Indeed,
Mootz takes for granted the central issue that divides conservative
and radical jurists: "Lawyers know very well that argumentation is a
bounded and rational enterprise that nevertheless cannot aspire to
process of deduction from principles, even though the rhetorical
conventions of legal practice and judicial opinion-writing ironically
work to conceal this (supposedly dangerous) fact."' 14 It is this very
idea of boundedness and rationality that goes to the crux of the
jurisprudential debate. To varying degrees, mainstream jurists (of
whom Dworkin is the leading example) cling to the idea that the
political debate that goes on within law is rendered bounded by the
resources of law and disciplined by the universal constraints of
rationality. In hewing such a rhetorical line, Mootz is a vast
improvement on Dworkin as he is much less attached to truth and
method. Indeed, for all his hermeneutical huff and puff, Dworkin is
keen to develop an algorithm by which to approve of some readings
over others. Mootz has challenged those assumptions and shown
that, as a rhetorical practice, law generates its own conventions of
argumentation that establish the bounds of its own jurisdiction and
the nature of its own rationality. As he puts it, "rhetorical knowledge
is a practical achievement that neither achieves apodictic certitude
nor collapses into relativistic irrationalism; rhetorical knowledge
therefore sustains legal practice as a reasonable-even if not
41
thoroughly rationalized -social activity.""
Nevertheless, although Mootz has managed to break free of the
epistemological grip of traditional philosophizing, he refuses to take
the necessary steps to get beyond its cramping confines. In short,
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Mootz is still very much in the conservative game of looking for

"theoretical backing" and establishing "disciplined encounters":
"rhetorical knowledge is a constitutive feature of legal practice that
grounds any theoretical reconstruction and critique of that
practice. 14 2 Like Dworkin, Mootz wants to make law safe for lawyers
by making legal practices understandable in their own right: "viewing
law as intrinsically and irredeemably rhetorical reaffirms its integrity

143
and legitimacy as a practice of securing reasonable adherence.'
Indeed, Mootz manages to put Gadamer to work in exactly the kind
of foundational tradition that Gadamer purportedly criticizes and
rejects. This turn to natural law, "even if in dramatically new
form,"' 14" is exactly the wrong way to go; it emphasizes and works with
those conservative elements of Gadamer's texts that comprise part of
his approach, but are by no means exclusive or exhaustive in their
interpretation. Moreover, Mootz runs with those ideas into far-off
places. It is not that I am claiming that Mootz has got Gadamer
wrong-a very non-Gadamerian idea. Instead, I argue that it is not a
helpful place to take Gadamer; it tends to head toward the very
locations of essentialism, rationalism, and foundationalism that much
of Gadamer's work seems best interpreted to abandon. Mootz seems

to want to foundationalize Gadamer and use his hermeneutical
account as a ground from which to defend the legal enterprise against
'' 5
"the celebration of boundless and playful irrationalism. 14
In addressing this issue, it is instructive to note the views of
Gadamer himself on the subversive and nontraditional aspects of his

142. Mootz, supra note 119, at 566.
143. Id. at 568.
144. Mootz, supra note 26, at 312. For a critique of Gadamer's lingering foundationalism,
see HORACE L. FAIRLAMB, CRITICAL CONDITIONS: POSTMODERNITY AND THE QUESTION OF
FOUNDATIONS (1994); DAVID COUZENS HOY & THOMAS MCCARTHY, CRITICAL THEORY

188-200 (1994); John D. Caputo, Gadamer's Closet Essentialism: A Derridean Critique, in
DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER, supra note 1, at
258-64 (1989). Although I will not pursue the matter here, it is very questionable how new this
new form of natural law actually is. Indeed, it only seems new because of the limited memories
of the jurisprudential community. See, e.g., RUDOLF STAMMLER, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Isaac
Husik trans., 1925). At one point in Mootz's argument, he asserts that Fuller and Weinreb's
natural law philosophies "are best viewed as elaborating the implications of philosophical
hermeneutics in the context of legal theory," Mootz, supra note 26, at 314, and as proceeding "in
a manner that echoes Gadamer's postmodern philosophical claims," id. at 337. This is wild stuff
because either Fuller and Weinreb have become postmodernists (an unlikely possibility) or
"postmodern" has become distinctly un-postmodern in Mootz's hands (a more likely
possibility). Indeed, Mootz seems to want to have it both ways-to open up the hermeneutical
process to more pluralistic and historically engaged possibilities and to limit that process so that
interpretation is not open ended.
145. Mootz, supra note 119, at 497.
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own writings. Presumably, in light of Gadamer's own arguments, the
authority of the text's author is severely diminished. Indeed, it is
surely a staple of Gadamerian hermeneutics that the author has little
authority in controlling or constraining the future interpretation given
to the text and that the reader's own prejudices or fore-conceptions
are inevitably in play. He insists that "every age has to understand a
transmitted text in its own way' 1 46 such that its meaning does not
depend on "the contingencies of the author and his original
audience... for it is always co-determined also by the historical
situation of the interpreter.' 1 47 Accordingly, "not just occasionally
but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author" and "that is
why understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a
productive activity as well."' 14 This does not mean that Gadamer has
no part to play in the unfolding debate over the meaning of
Gadamer's hermeneutical texts, only that he must engage with the
debate and his own texts as a future reader, not as their past author.
Moreover, it seems odd that those scholars who claim to be disciples
of Gadamer's hermeneutics should read Gadamer's text in such an
un-Gadamer-like way. As Gadamer insists, the meanings of texts do
not present themselves for inspection, but must be created in the
encounter between the text and its interpreter: "[T]he hermeneutic
task consists in not covering up [the tension between the text and the
present] by attempting a naive assimilation of the two but in
consciously bringing it out. ' 149 As I understand it, this is not to claim
that the reader is sovereign and unconstrained, only that the reader
has an inevitable and decisive part to play in the hermeneutical
encounter. Neither the text, nor its author can have the last word in
what their texts will come to mean. And that insight must be as
apposite for interpreting hermeneutical texts as it is for interpreting
any other kind of text.
The problem is that, while Mootz (and Gadamer to some extent)
have historicized law and adjudication, they have only politicized it in
the most superficial and sanitized way. If Gadamer (and Mootz) are
right to chastise traditional philosophers and jurists for their failure to
recognize the inevitable historicization of interpretation and dialogue,
then I am right to chastise Gadamer (and Mootz) for their failure to
politicize that inevitable historicization of interpretation and
146. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 296.
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dialogue.15 There is something missing from such jurisprudential
accounts and that something is the matrix of ideological forces that
drive this historical process of rhetorical tradition. In a manner of
speaking, Mootz has identified the Gadamerian vehicle and traced its
hermeneutical route, but has offered no explanation of how it moves
and what determines that route; it is a road show without gas or
drivers. While Gadamer and Mootz each incorporate values into
their rhetorical account of law, they do so in such a way that the
passion and commitment with which they are held and presented are
filtered out and converted into rational entities to be weighed and
balanced on the rhetorical scales. The world of Gadamerian politics
is a sterile and barren world in which the material dirt of ideological
politics and interests has been washed off so that judges and
rhetoricians do not get their hands soiled with life as it is actually
lived.
But this sanitization misrepresents the grubbiness and
messiness of the real social world. In so doing, Mootz and other
conservative jurists ensure that such an hermeneutical approach can
only succeed by pretending that it is operating in a nonideological
environment in which the reasonable has already been distinguished
from the arbitrary, the disciplined from the anarchical, the stabilized
from the fluxed, the authoritative from the irrational, and the playful
from the serious. Mootz's Gadamer-inspired natural law program is
abstract and arid; it is as much an escape from social life as the
traditional philosophies that it claims to reject and replace.
At the root of this problem is the central notion of tradition. For
Mootz, the confrontation between text and reader takes place within
a tradition or conversation that obliges the interpreter to filter out the
productive and approved prejudices from the unproductive and
arbitrary ones. In this sense, the tradition has a tendency to engulf
and swamp the interpreter to such an extent they become part of it.
As Gadamer puts it, the hermeneutical game has a spirit of its own
that "masters" the players and holds them in its thrall.15' Explaining
that "the player experiences the game as a reality that surpasses
him,"152 he goes so far as to conclude that "the players no longer exist,
'
only what they are playing."153
However, these Gadamerian claims
150. For a general critique along similar, but not the same, lines, see generally, THOMAS B.
FARREL, NORMS OF RHETORICAL CULTURE (1993); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE:
STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987).
151. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 106.
152. Id. at 109.
153. Id. at 112.
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only have any jurisprudential purchase or plausibility if it is assumed
that the rhetorical tradition of law is sufficiently coherent and
homogenous to underwrite the evaluative claims that he makes for it.
For instance, it is Mootz's assertion that, while legal practice is far
from "a technique that delivers exact knowledge,"' 5 it can and does
generate "rhetorical principles to serve as aids in exercising good
judgment when choosing between competing interpretations. 15 5 In
order to fulfill this critical function, these principles must be
sufficiently ordered, expansive, and determinate to do the work that
is asked of them. But, in modern society, law, and jurisprudence,
there are simply too many traditions and none that receive the
general approval or sanction that would enable Mootz's proposal to
fly. While Mootz is right to advance the argument that "a just legal
practice, like a life well lived, does not circle around a determinate
ground of truth,' 15 6 he is mistaken to conclude that such a practice
"spirals forward from a shared tradition in the form of reasonable
judgments about how to proceed.' 1 57 When it comes to adjudication,
difficulties tend to arise in those circumstances when there is no
shared tradition and people are divided in their reasonable
commitments. It seems a little hollow to recommend that such
division should be mended or mediated through a resort to law's
rhetorical traditions when the very existence of multiple or fractured
traditions is what caused the problem in the first place.
Consequently, tradition is not a grounding for anything if that means
it can afford a solution rather simply provide a site for competing
views. As I will seek to demonstrate, there is another reading of
Gadamer that plays down its foundational side and plays up its more
radical possibilities.
VII. TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION
There are two general notions of tradition that tend to dominate
and organize debate. One is premised on the unstated notion that
there is something normatively compelling or worthy about what has
come before; the past is not followed simply because it precedes, but
because it is superior to present understandings. Accepted by earlier
154. Mootz, supra note 26, at 378.
155. Id.
156. Mootz, supra note 119, at 583.
157. Id. For another critique of Gadamer that holds him to a monolithic and authorityimposing view of historical tradition, see TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 70-74 (1983).
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generations and having withstood the test of time, tradition binds not
simply because it has not been replaced or altered, but because it has
its own normative force. The past is not simply a store of information
and materials, but an obligatory source of value and guidance that is
entitled to be given normative preference over present understandings and uninhibited ratiocination; the past is what makes
society into what it is today and the decision to respect it is what gives
meaning to the lives of future generations. Viewing people as
custodians rather than creators of tradition, this conservative
Burkean approach talks in terms of "the great primeval contract of
eternal society" in which "the partnership.., between those who are
living and those who are dead, and those who are to be born."'15 8 The
other approach maintains that, if there is to be genuine progress and
emancipation, there must be a complete break from that past. This
revolutionary stance is given expression in Marx's warning that "the
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the
brains of the living"'5 9 and that progressive activity "cannot draw its
poetry from the past... [but] must let the dead bury their dead."' 6°
On this view, whatever is normatively compelling about the past is
oppressive and, to escape its baleful influence, people must become
the undertakers, not the custodians of the past; there must be a
complete rescission of the contractual partnership between past and
future generations.
Predictably, both these polarized approaches are overstated and
miss the mark. Burke's reverence for the past is as complacent as it is
unrealistic, and Marx's condemnation of the past is as paralyzing as it
is unrealizable. Both divert attention away from the available
possibilities for change and transformation that always already exist
within traditions and that cannot be expunged by even the most
exhaustive or authoritative analysis. Marx's warning must be taken
seriously in that the deadening force of tradition can cast a disabling
pall over living efforts to improve the future, as must Burke's
recommendation in that the past has much to offer that can be worthy
of selective preservation. Although the Burkean appeal to tradition
must be approached with skepticism and caution, Marx's plea is both
158.

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 85 (John G.A.

Pocock ed., 1987); see also FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF FREE
PEOPLE 153-76 (1979); ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985); Anthony T.
Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1037 (1990).
159. KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 13 (C.P. Dutt ed.,
1957).
160. Id. at 16.
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impossible and unnecessary. It is impossible in that there is no
language or materials in the present from which to imagine a better
future that are not passed on from the past; there is no way for people
to step outside themselves to some elusive site or state of mind that is
untouched by the past. However, fortunately, it is unnecessary to
attempt such a prodigious feat because the past is neither so dead nor
so determined as to occlude its poetic revitalization in aid of future
imaginings; there is no shortage of opportunities for transformative
creativity. As such, there is no need to embrace either the Burkean
traditionalist or the Marxian antitraditionalist stance; the celebration
of tradition for its own sake or its condemnation for any other sake is
a false dichotomy. And this is where Gadamer enters the picture. He
offers an account of tradition-or, at least, the radical one that I
intend to offer-that is much more nuanced and, therefore, much less
dogmatic. On a more critical and suggestive account, tradition and
transformation do not stand opposed, but each feeds off and
complements the other. As such, mindful that "tradition is the living
faith of the dead, [whereas] traditionalism is the dead faith of the
living,' 161 my approach is about tradition, but it is not traditionalist
(i.e., in which continuity is valued over change) and is about
transformation, but is not revolutionary (i.e., in which change is
preferred to continuity).
The fact that there is no choice other than to follow and
therefore live, at least in part, in the past says nothing about what it is
in the past that we must follow or respect. To uphold a tradition does
not mean that it has to be done in an uncreative or uncritical way;
there is choice and, therefore, there are always politics in play. As
Jacques Derrida puts it:
That we are heirs does not mean that we have or that we receive this

or that, some inheritance that enriches us one day with this or that,
but that the being of what we
are is first of all inheritance, whether
we like it or know it or not. 162
Inheritance is an undertaking that those in the present are obliged to
perform, but there is no one or only way to fulfill that definitive
responsibility. What is given about any tradition is always open to
appropriation and contestation; resort to the past is, therefore, always
and unavoidably political. There is no one monolithic and unified
161. JAROSLAV J. PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 65 (1984).
162. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF
MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 54 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994); see also EDWARD
A. SHILS, TRADITION 44 (1981).
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account of the past that stands in for history or that can claim to be
the past's ineffable bruteness. Any attempt to justify a masternarrative of the past (from a materialist right, a socialist left, a liberal
center or anywhere else) is destined to fail; it will be either so abstract
as to ignore the contingent and nuanced facts or so detailed as to be
little more than a literal recounting of those facts. Although the
appeal to tradition is only meaningful if that tradition is sufficiently
determinate and discrete, history shows that traditions are
notoriously imprecise and that they are infuriatingly difficult to pin
down. Like anything and everything else, traditions are not so much
discovered as constructed in the act of following them. Moreover,
because so much of the debate around tradition is less about its
heterogeneity and more about the features that are seen to hold it
together and which define its homogeneity, the ideas of tradition and
transformation have come to be seen as antithetical. However, in
most of life (and law), "breaking with tradition" is as traditional as it
gets. Indeed, although offered more by way of caution than
encouragement, Gadamer notes that, while people exist and thrive
within a tradition, "it is still in the nature of [people] to be able to

break with tradition, to criticize and dissolve

''

it. 163

Whereas

Gadamer works to contain that instinct, I work to nourish it.
In the conventional understanding, tradition is held out as a
dated accumulation of commitments, customs, and practices that are
accepted with little room for critical examination or imaginative
reformulation. On a more critical Gadamerian reading, tradition is
not a thing of the past, but something that is vital; people constantly
participate in it and reconstruct it as they rely upon it. Indeed,
traditions survive by adaptation and change. If they do not change,
they become ossified and die. As such, traditions are alive, organic,
and part of the present; they are not simply the flotsam and jetsam of
the forward-moving ship of history as it steams into the future.
Moreover, because traditions are understood as organic and social in
that they are transmitted from one generation to another, change is at
the dynamic heart of a genuine practice of tradition. As participants
rely upon the tradition, they are also contributing to and transforming
that tradition:
[T]he circle of understanding.., is neither subjective nor objective,
but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of
tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of
163. GADAMER, supra note 2, at xxxvii.
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meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of
subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to
the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed in
our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent
precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we
understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence
further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is
not a methodological circle. 164
On this reading of Gadamer, "the circle of understanding" is
historical and political. Traditions are neither fixed, nor bounded
and, in being passed on and assumed by individuals, they are
constantly reworked and remade (as are the individuals who engage
with them). As such, the interpretation and application of a tradition
is also an act of amending that tradition; "the thing which
hermeneutics teaches us is to see through the dogmatism of asserting
an opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural 'tradition'
and the reflective appropriation of it. ' ' 165 This means that following a
tradition is not simply a matter of identifying a fixed continuity
between the past and present, but also involves certain rearrangements, ruptures, and reversals. This act of reconstruction is both
deconstructive and reconstructive. Although there is always the risk
of confirming that which is being deconstructed, the most respectful
reaffirmation of the past's traditions is realized in constantly placing
them under critical scrutiny and transforming their substance as their
spirit is observed. If a tradition is to remain alive and relevant, its
institutional guardians must negotiate a paradoxical task that is the
constant source of both their reassuring empowerment and unsettling
usurpation: they must work with and against "the tension between
memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given
to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new,
and a break.' 1 66 Like the wicked, there is no rest or respite for these
guardians. But this is only a problem for those who mistakenly insist
that change or newness is to be feared. Tradition and those assigned
the task of interpreting it are works-in-progress whose character, if
they have one, is to be always at work and always in progress.
Like all games, law's language game is a vast tradition of almost
infinitely possible argumentative moves in which each player must
come to a decision as to which move to make. The moment and
164. Id. at 293.
165. GADAMER, supra note 97, at 28.
166. The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, in J. CAPUTO,
DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA 6 (1997).
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nature of the decision made cannot be grounded in anything outside
itself; there is no possibility of an acontextual metric for closure. That
decision is never entirely justifiable by or reducible to the principles
or rules of the tradition alone of which it claims to be an application.
A particular performance or move cannot be detached from the
general game itself-each can only be fully appreciated in the context
of the other. It is the subject or player that both occupies and fills the
gap between the game's indeterminate possibilities and the
determinate decision made. As such, judges do not stand astride the
game, but are altered and shaped by the game's limits as they play to
reconstruct those limits; they are influenced by the present contours
of the game as they influence the game's continuing performance and
possibilities. There is no final or enduring span between the game's
general indeterminacy and particular decisions that is not itself
destabilized by the constituted and constituting identity of the
different players in the game's traditions. Politics is always present
and irrepressible because general indeterminacy both gives rise to
and continues to permeate the particular decision made.
By
understanding the move from general indeterminacy in this way, it
should be clear why I resist the nihilistic conclusion that "anything
goes"; the idea that there is complete freedom to decide makes no
sense at all because it is only within a tradition of constraints, albeit
thoroughly contingent and revisable in content and direction, that
decision making can be comprehended. While this understanding of
tradition is to be contrasted to the pedant's or formalist's timidity and
dependence on rules, it is also to be set off against the anarchist's
bravado in ignoring all rules; freedom and its ultimate exercise in
genius is less about divine detachment and more about the
transformation of the existing traditions in novel and disruptive ways.
In this transformative account of tradition, there are grounds of
and for decisions, but they are contingent and unstable: reasons can
be given as to why one decision is better than another, but these
arguments are never themselves guaranteed or vouchsafed outside
the context of ideological argument.
Without some formative
structure or informing context, there would be no game as a process
of human engagement and reflection. Indeed, the very notion of
choice implies a constrained context that identifies what is and is not
being chosen between. Moreover, the choice is not, as Mootz and
others suppose it to be, between "a disciplined encounter with the
activity of rhetorical knowledge" and "a boundless and playful
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irrationalism";167 this is only to reinstall another false dichotomy
between reason and nonreason. Consequently, legal reasoning is
about the moves that are presently in play and that structure law's
reasoning game in such a way as to enable choices between
competing definitions of particular rules in light of their general
indeterminacy. However, while providing an argumentative context
for reasoning and definition, these moves are themselves being
contingently reworked. As such, the rules of law's reasoning game or
tradition do not so much constrain or cabin judges' room for
maneuver as make it possible and operational; "to be situated within
a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it
possible. ' 168 Viewed in this way, law is confirmed as a rhetorical
activity in which the different techniques of legal reasoning are to be
treated less as "rules" and more as moves in a game in which its
defining rules are always in play. Legal tradition is not simply a
process that is to be known and thereby governed; it is part of an
active engagement in which "tradition is a genuine partner in
dialogue ' 169 with its judicial interlocutors and, in engaging in that
dialogue, both the tradition and the interlocutor are "transformed
1 70
into a communion in which [they] do not remain what [they] were.
When Gadamer states that, in a hermeneutical approach,
"understanding is thought of less as a subjective act than as
participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in
which past and present are constantly mediated, ' 171 I want to
emphasize how the "subjective act" is not consumed by the
"tradition," but how the two interact. In the same way that the
"subjective act" is not meaningfully comprehended or even possible
outside the "tradition," so the "tradition" does not stand independently of the "subjective acts" that create and re-create it. Furthermore, when Gadamer states that the hermeneutical challenge is that
of "acquiring an appropriate historical horizon,"'72 I have no quarrels
with this as long as "appropriate" is understood in a nonobjective,
political, and contingent way. Accordingly, rather than talk about

167. Mootz, supra note 119, at 497.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 173-78.
168. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 361.
169. Id. at 358.
170. Id. at 379.
171. Id. at 290.
172. Id. at 303.

This line of argument is developed further in
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obligation in the sense of a fixed meaning or talk about freedom in
the sense of no fixed meaning at all, it is better to
think of the whole performance in a way that is both bound and
free. In a certain sense interpretation probably is re-creation, but
this is a re-creation not of the creative act but of the created work,
which has to be brought to representation
in accord with the
173
meaning the interpreter finds in it.
Although Gadamer is commenting upon festivals, his remarks are
apposite to the judicial encounter between law's tradition and the
individual judge in reaching a discrete decision in a particular
controversy:
As a festival, it is not an identity like a historical event, but neither
is it determined by its origin so that there was once the "real"
festival-as distinct from the way in which it later came to be
celebrated. From its inception-whether instituted in a single act
or introduced gradually-the nature of a festival is to be celebrated
regularly. Thus its own original essence is always to be something
different (even when celebrated in exactly the same way). An
entity that exists only by always being something different is
temporal in a more radical sense than everything that
belongs to
174
history. It has its being only in becoming and return.
Under my portrayal of the common law tradition, not only is
there no compelling justification why judges should rein in their own
critical judgments in supposed deference to those implicit in law's
substantive traditions, but there is a cogent reason why they should
give full and open expression to them: judges respect the common law
tradition best when they scrutinize, interrogate, challenge, and make
it conform with justice. Of course, they do not do this from outside
the tradition, but work with and within the tradition. This idea is
perfectly captured by Derrida when he states that
for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper
moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it
must conserve the law and destroy it or suspend it enough to
reinvent it in each case, rejustifying it, at least reinvent it in175the
reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of it principle.
Accordingly, the style of judging that captures most faithfully the
cherished traditions of the common law is one that involves both a
constant reinterpretation of past decisions and a perpetual openness
to future reinterpretation. And, of course, such a style of judging

173.
174.
175,
L. REV.

Id. at 119.
Id. at 123.
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO
919, 962 (1990).
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must equally question its own biases and implications. Nonetheless, if
it is to be given its due, each new case is entitled to more than an
unthinking reliance on existing doctrine or rules: it requires the judge
to make a fresh judgment that actively reappraises as it reaffirms the
traditions of legal doctrine. Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom,
it is the relentless critic who most closely grasps and continues the
common law tradition than those who insist on a timid acceptance of
what has already been decided. To treat the law as static or to adopt
an unquestioning posture toward it is to betray, not uphold, the
common law tradition.
Some of the best evidence for this claim can be found in the
phenomenon and, dare I say, tradition of so-called "great cases."
77
These are cases-Brown v. Board of Education,17 6 Roe v. Wade,1
Miranda v. Arizona178 and their ilk in American constitutional lawthat are regarded by almost all lawyers as landmarks of the common
law tradition. While their precise import and reach are continuously
contested, any credible account of the common law must be able to
incorporate their authoritative, if indeterminate intimations. However, the very existence of such cases, and particularly the
circumstances of their origin, seems to confound the legitimacy of the
process that they allegedly anchor and from which they purportedly
arise. The skeptical observer might be forgiven for thinking that
great cases appear to be less a continuation of legal tradition and
more of a break with existing traditions; they tend to exemplify a
deviation from existing commitments, not a derivation from them.
Accordingly, while great cases represent the impressive pragmatic
strength of the common law in being able to adapt to fresh challenges
and new conditions, they also present jurists with their most pressing
jurisprudential challenge in explaining the operation of the common
law over time. Insofar as great cases are the heart and soul of the
common law, it must be explained why that common law tradition is
considered to extol all the virtues of restraint and caution that the
creation and acceptance of great cases so gloriously flaunt. Indeed,
mindful that the self-imposed task of mainstream jurists, including
those of a philosophical as well as a hermeneutical persuasion, is to
defend common law adjudication as a rational, disciplined, and
bounded process, great cases seem to reveal the common law to be

176. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
177. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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more of a political, unruly and open-ended process. In contrast, my
critical account seeks to demonstrate that the common law's sense of
its own tradition is attenuated and impoverished; there is little
appreciation of the organic and evanescent character of tradition and
its transformative possibilities. Once the incidence, importance, and
influence of great cases are conceded, the tradition of the common
law is seen to be less about stability and continuity and more about
change and transformation. Although lawyers and jurists emphasize
the routine, it will be the radical occasions of great cases that the best
179
capture its dynamic spirit.

VIII. GLUCKSBERG REVISITED

As I have tried to show, my quarrel with Justice Souter, Mootz
and, to a lesser extent, Gadamer is not so much with how they depict
the prosaic operation of the common law, but more with the
extravagant claims that they make for their account. Indeed, while I
agree in large part with their pragmatic description of common law
adjudication, I disagree that this hermeneutical method can live up to
the traditional expectations that are placed upon it; it fails to deliver
on the formalist promise that common law adjudication is a bounded
and objective process that can give rise to relatively determinate and
predictable resolutions of disputed controversies in a way that
distinguishes legal decision making from overtly political or
ideological disputation. Accordingly, having offered an alternative
and critical hermeneutical account of the common law, it is incumbent
on me to make good on my claim that "law is politics." I need to
show that, far from being a check on or removed from political
debate, adjudication is another site, albeit stylized and technical, for
political confrontation in which "anything might go." In short, I must
revisit Glucksberg and demonstrate that Justice Souter's judgment
implodes from the hermeneutical force of his own arguments.
Whatever the claims that he or his jurisprudential apologists make for
it, his judgment actually confirms rather than refutes that there is no
method that can absolve judges or anyone else from the responsibility
and challenge of constantly arguing and rearguing what should and
should not be done in particular contexts at particular times. As
Souter himself said in an earlier judgment, "even when jurists reason
179. For a full development of this theme and its jurisprudential implications, see ALLAN C.
HUTCHINSON, In Praiseof Leading Cases, in LEADING CASES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1,

2-27 (E. O'Dell ed., 2000).
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from shared premises, some disagreement is inevitable ...[but] that
is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which must

accommodate life's complexity.' 180 Moreover, Souter's Glucksberg
opinion corroborates rather than confutes that there is no escaping
politics, especially through a resort to "reasoned judgment" and

"tradition," to a technical or sanitized conversation in which the basic
struggle over whose interests count and what they count for can be
sidestepped. Understood and read with a critical eye, the judgment
and its ensuing juristic reception make the critical case that "law is

politics" in that adjudication is only bounded and objective insofar as
its bounds and values are thoroughly political and revisable.
It will be remembered that, in determining the existence and
scope of any constitutionally protected right to die, Souter considered

that his judicial task is not to substitute the court's view of what is or
is not the most reasonable balance of competing interests, but to
check whether the legislative view "falls outside the realm of the
reasonable"' 181 and imposes "arbitrary impositions and purposeless

restraints.' ' 12

To do this, judges must be engaged in "reasoned

judgment"'183

that will ensure that they do not indulge the "merely

personal and private notions" 18 of justice of any particular judge.
This reasoned judgment will eschew all-or-nothing analysis in terms
of either textual or extra-textual absolutes. Instead, operating at a

"the proper level of generality"' 185 and "pay[ing] respect... to
detail,' 18 6 judges must restrict those values deserving constitutional

protection only to "those exemplified by 'the traditions from which
180. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). It is important to stress that it
is not part of my critique (nor does such a concession weaken my critique) to demonstrate that
Justice Souter got it right or wrong on the particular facts. Properly understood, the central
force of my critique is that any resolution of the case and the more general issue of a physicianassisted right to die is a political and contested matter, not a neutral or objective one. Like
abortion, the debate is morally difficult and politically fraught and so can be temporarily
clarified, but never conclusively settled. However, for the record, I should state that my present
position is that the recognition of such a right, suitably narrowed and regulated, is warranted;
this might well change as circumstances and my response to them shift. And, of course, the right
will only extend to the enlisting of willing physicians. While I recognize that there is a pertinent
difference between killing and failing to save, I tend to agree with the implied thrust of Oscar
Wilde's poem: "Yet each man kills the thing he loves /By each let this be heard, / Some do it
with a bitter look, / Some with a flattering word. / The coward does it with a kiss, / The brave
man with a sword!" OSCAR WILDE, THE BALLAD OF READING GAOL AND OTHER POEMS 254
(R.E. Adams ed., 1926) (1898).
181. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 764 (1997).
182. Id. at 765.
183. Id. at 769.
184. Id. at 267.
185. Id. at 772.
186. Id. at 770.
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[the Nation] developed,' or revealed by contrast with 'the traditions
Consequently, after such an "exact
from which it broke." ' 187
analysis,"' 1 Justice Souter reached the conclusion that, while "the
importance of the individual interest here ... cannot be gainsaid
[and] ... whether that interest might in some circumstances, or at
some time, be seen as 'fundamental' . . . I am satisfied that the State's
interests ... are sufficiently serious to defeat the present claim that its
law is arbitrary or purposeless.1 ' 89 Although Souter accepted that
there is a tradition of extending patients' rights to bodily integrity and
to medical care, he maintained that the state's "slippery slope"
concern "is fairly made out here,.., because there is a plausible case
that the right claimed would not be readily containable by reference
to facts about the mind that are matters of difficult judgment, or by
gatekeepers who are subject to temptation, noble or not." 19°
There is no doubt that Souter's judgment is sophisticated and
plausible; it offers a reasoned and reasonable intervention in a
controversial and continuing debate. Indeed, there is much in Justice
Souter's excursus on common law method that emphasizes the
Gadamerian themes of historical context, performative dynamism,
and organic tradition; "just as results in substantive due process cases
are tied to the selections of statements of the competing interests, the
acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons for the
selections made." 191 Indeed, there are three particular traditionssocial, legal, and judicial-in play in Glucksberg and which Souter
maintains are receptive to the hermeneutical kind of reasoned
However, there are several
judgment that he recommends.
argumentative maneuvers or rhetorical ruses that rob the judgment of
In the
the hermeneutical cogency that it claims and craves.
Gadamerianesque prose adopted by Souter, "if the acceptability of
the result is a function of the good reasons given," then the result is
not acceptable because the supporting reasons are wanting and not
persuasive. Despite the Gadamerian trappings, there is still the
underlying commitment to the idea that adjudication is a largely
technical endeavor, which demands rigorous discipline, which lends
itself to exact analysis, which is amenable to close criticism, which
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 767.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 785. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING

THE CONSTITUTION 65-120 (1991).

191. Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 770.
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repays attention to detail, and all of which can be achieved in a
politically neutral manner. Contrary to Justice Souter's (and Mootz's,
Gadamer's, and most other traditional jurists') fervent hope, it simply
is not possible to perform this judicial task in a way that makes the
legal outcome completely independent of the "merely personal and
private notions"1 92 of justice of any particular judge; such notions can
be concealed or overlooked, but they cannot be excluded or
eliminated.
A closer reading and parsing of Justice Souter's
arguments make such a critical evaluation both clearer and more
convincing.
The first traditions that Justice Souter looks to are those social
practices that surround and inform the particular right claimed; he
examines the constitutional, legal, and social history of suicide and
physician assistance to the dying.
However, as Justice Souter
recognizes, there is not only no one tradition, but the several existing
traditions are indeterminate in scope and often competing with each
other. This will mean that it is crucial to identify a device by which to
determine "the proper level of generality"' 193 at which these competing
traditions are to be characterized so as to ascertain which are entitled
to constitutional protection. This, of course, is where reasoned
judgment enters the doctrinal picture: "selecting among such
competing characterizations demands reasoned judgment about
which broader principle, as exemplified in the concrete privileges and
prohibitions embodied in our legal tradition, best fits the particular
claim asserted in a particular case." '94 To do this with "exactitude,"' 195
Souter recommends a number of requirements, such "as applying
concepts of normal critical reasoning, as pointing to the need to
attend to the levels of generality at which countervailing interests are
stated, or as examining the concrete application of principles for
fitness with their own ostensible justifications.1'9 6 Mindful that all of
this has to be done in an objective and neutral manner without illicit
reliance on the "merely personal and private notions"1 97 of justice of
192. Id. at 767. I do not mean to suggest that the only choice is between "merely personal
and private notions" of justice and robustly objective and public notions. In this analysis, my
purpose is to demonstrate that there is no objective method available to judges that can enable
them to finesse the intrusion of political prejudices. For a fuller treatment of this distinction and
connection between personal and objective, see Hutchinson, supra note 73.
193. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 772.
194. Id. at 771 n.ll.
195. Id. at 772.
196. Id. at 773.
197. Id. at 767.
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any particular judge, Justice Souter has sent judges on a sleeveless
errand; there is no way that they can complete such an analysis as a
purely technical or strictly legal matter. Once it is accepted that
reliance on dominant traditions without more is unjustified, Souter is
into the political game of deciding which traditions, to paraphrase
Justice Harlan, are those "from which the country should develop"
and those "from which the country should break."' 98 Because
"tradition is a living thing,"19 9 it is the self-assumed responsibility of
judges to decide which parts of the tradition should die in order for
the tradition to thrive. z°° This is a profoundly political task. And it
becomes more and not less so, when it is allegedly done by deference
to existing traditions.
Although the appeal to tradition is only meaningful if that
tradition is sufficiently determinate and discrete, history shows that
traditions are notoriously imprecise and that they are infuriatingly
difficult to pin down. Like anything and everything else, traditions
are not so much discovered as constructed in the act of following
them. Even when pitched at a classificatory level of great specificity,
it does not speak for itself and cannot excuse judges from making
critical and contestable choices. Also, this seems to suggest that
tradition is one factor in the doctrinal decision as to whether to
recognize certain liberties as sufficiently fundamental, but that is not
the only and certainly not the decisive criterion. Indeed, although the
right claimed in Glucksberg is quite discrete as it involves limited
groups (i.e., doctors) in limited circumstances (i.e., dying and
suffering patients), it is next to impossible to identify a physicianassisted right-to-die tradition in Anglo-American law and society;
Chief Justice Rehnquist surely has the best of this argument in
Glucksberg. While there are incipient signs that such a tradition
might be taking shape (e.g., there has been a general decriminalization of suicide), the claim that such a tradition has moved beyond
some initial threshold of viability would mean that almost any
practice could claim to be a tradition and, therefore, worthy of at least
being taken seriously in constitutional discourse, even if not
ultimately accepted as a fundamental value. Moreover, if tradition is
the decisive test of whether something is a fundamental interest or
not, many of the leading cases in the substantive due process tradition
198. See id.
199. Id. at 765.
200. See id. at 771 n.11, 772-73.
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would not cut the constitutional mustard. The most spectacular
example of this is Roe v. Wade. 0 1 There was no obvious tradition in
Anglo-American legal tradition of such a right being recognized; if
anything the denial of such a right was more an integral part of any
2 02
extant tradition.
Justice Souter's efforts to steer clear of this political terrain are
based upon the possibility that judges can restrict themselves to
policing the boundaries of reasonableness. Rather than argue over
whether one approach is more or less reasonable than another, judges
can confine their analysis to whether the legislative intervention "falls
outside the realm of the reasonable" 20 3 and whether its "justifying
principle, critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with
the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied. 2 ' 04
However, this assumes that what is and is not "arbitrary" and
''purposeless" is seen to reside outside the historical flow of social
tradition and, therefore, outside politics. But this smacks of the most
ahistorical and inorganic approach to tradition. This maneuver only
-works if the "arbitrary" and the "purposeless" are simply givens that
can be discovered, not chosen. Yet, the history of America's social
traditions suggests that such assumptions are invalid. There is
nothing arbitrary about, for example, bigotry. While racist or sexist
prejudice might be unreasonable, it is not arbitrary or purposeless;
bigots have as many reasons for their beliefs and actions as liberals.
The identity of the arbitrary and purposeless has to be argued for, as
it is inside, not outside the political forces that it is meant to regulate
and evaluate.
The fact that there might be almost complete
agreement on certain values or activities being outside the pale of
reasonableness does not make such a conclusion any less political. It
is not about whether there are reasons: there always are. It is
whether those reasons are considered good or bad ones. After all,
racism and sexism of the most rampant kind were once, as Justice
Souter would surely agree, so broadly accepted and deeply rooted
that they brooked little challenge, at least among those with political
power and franchise. In the world of the past, it would have been the
201. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
202. See id. at 130-41. Other examples include a right to contraceptives outside of marriage.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (any
general right to marry). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Against Tradition, 13 SOC. PHIL. &
POLICY 207 (1996).
203. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764.
204. Id. at 768.
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abolitionist/antiracist or the feminist who would have been
"arbitrary" and "purposeless."
Furthermore, if a reliance on social tradition, albeit in a modified
and sensitive manner, is used to identify constitutional rights, it will
be those minorities who most need protection against majority views
that will be denied constitutional protection. Unless tradition is
expanded to include whatever people have done whether in support
of or opposition to traditional values, constitutional protection will
only extend to those whose values and activities conform with the
tradition and who are less likely to require such protection. However,
of course, once tradition is interpreted so broadly and indiscriminately, its legal use becomes entirely vacuous because there is no
legal test, which is not itself political, to organize social practices into
accepted and rejected traditions. Mindful that the level of generality
is so vague and so variable, it is possible to use tradition to support all
kinds of competing positions.2 °5 After all, it was not so long ago that
the use of racial discrimination was "deeply rooted" in America's
constitutional and demographic history. And I suspect that it will not
be too long (although still too long) before the Supreme Court
accepts that homophobia, while again "deeply rooted" in the nation's
constitutional and demographic history, is held to be a tradition from
which the courts should break rather than on which they should build.
As the split in Bowers v. Hardwick2 °6 evinced, the key as to whether
homosexuality can be interpreted as implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty or framed as part of those basic fundamental rights
already protected, as the doctrine apparently demands, will depend
on the level of generality at which such analysis is plausibly made; it is
not exactly a stretch to treat private homosexual relations as falling
within the established intimacy and privacy concepts of constitutional
liberty. 07 What determines the proper level of generality remains as
elusive and as crucial as it has always been. There is no proper level
of generality without some initial attachment to a preexisting
commitment to what liberty might entail. Such a question goes to the
very heart of politics, not law. Or, as I have sought to emphasize,
205. For a general critique of using tradition as any kind of foundation, see JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 60-63 (1980);

Robert M.

Cover, Foreward:Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
206. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that a sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental
rights of homosexuals).
207. See id. However, the more recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), has
already begun the erosion of the Bowers holding. On racial discrimination, see Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.).
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"law is politics" because the heart and soul of law is politics.
Moving on from social tradition, a similar kind of critique can be
applied to reliance on legal tradition. Indeed, the effort to rely on a
fixed or determinate tradition of substantive legal doctrine is as weak
and unsuccessful as the judicial effort to utilize social tradition to
ground constitutional interpretation. 2 8
Both traditions are so
numerous and imprecise that they can justify almost any reading.
Indeed, this resort to tradition tends to reinforce than resolve the
problem because it is difficult to ascertain what would be the
controlling tradition, constitutional or social, over and above a
particular judge's honest and evaluative conviction about what is was.
Justice Souter only grounds his decision by building a foundation for
it and, once history moves, that ground will itself be rendered
unstable and disclosed as only the function of Souter's contingent and
personal commitments, not its grounding. He fails to grasp that legal
tradition is not simply a process that is to be known and thereby
governed; it is part of an active engagement in which "tradition is a
genuine partner in dialogue" 20 9 with its judicial interlocutors and, in
engaging in that dialogue, both the tradition and the interlocutor are
"transformed into a communion in which [they] do not remain what
[they] were. ' 210 And, I want to add, that "communion" is itself
temporary, provisional, and contingent; it is a work-in-progress that
stands inside, not outside, the matrix of ideological forces that drive
the historical process of rhetorical tradition. As Gadamer reminds us
(even if he often forgets it himself), "from the hermeneutical
standpoint, rightly understood, it is absolutely absurd to regard the
concrete factors of work and politics as outside the scope of
21
hermeneutics." 1
When it comes to legal traditions, it has to be remembered that,
as well as being multiple and fractured, they are capable of being
abandoned when circumstances demand. Although courts are understandably reluctant to break from a long-standing legal tradition, they
are not only prepared to do so, but place an obligation on themselves
to so act at times. For instance, in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,212 the
Supreme Court divided over whether Roe should be overruled.
208. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977).
209. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 358.
210. Id. at 379.
211. GADAMER, supra note 97, at 31.
212. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Speaking jointly for the Court, with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
Justice Souter stated that there are moments when the Court best
fulfills its constitutional duty by repudiating earlier lines of cases: "in
in life, changed
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of
the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a
response to the Court's constitutional duty. '213 According to Justice
Souter, this should occur where the Court would have to pay a
"terrible price '214 for failure to act; this was the case in both West
Coast Hotel v. Parrishand Brown v. Board of Education.215 However,
cautioning that "[e]ach generation must learn anew that the
Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must
survive more ages than one," 216 he maintained that Roe not only did
not warrant overruling, but that its repudiation "would seriously
weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to
function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of
law. '21 7 In short, if the stakes are high enough, the fall-out sufficiently
severe, and the judges are so disposed, the breaking with established
constitutional tradition will occur; this is exactly what the minority
proposed to do. It was not that Souter and his colleagues thought
that such a course of action was entirely illegitimate; simply, that
Casey was not the appropriate occasion. It was an ideological call,
not a legal one, about social circumstances and political climate.
If this general critique is pertinent for social and legal traditions,
it is doubly valid for the other "judicial tradition" that is in play.
Beginning with the decision in Glucksberg itself, a cursory familiarity
with substantive due process doctrine and constitutional law generally
easily confirms that there is no one tradition of judicial justification.
Whatever the topic on which they join issue, the judgments of the
Supreme Court (and all other inferior courts) are always engaged in a
concerted effort to legitimate their decisions by virtue of the method
adopted. In Justice Souter's terms, they realize that "the acceptability
of the results is a function of the good reasons [given]. ' 218 Yet what
amounts to reasons, let alone good ones, is as divided as almost any
213. Id. at 863.
214. Id. at 864.
215. Id; see W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling the economic
liberty doctrine); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the separate but equal
doctrine).
216. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
217. Id. at 865.
218. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 770 (1997).
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other item on the constitutional agenda. Sometimes, the disagreement remains muffled and marginal; at other times, it becomes
voluble and central. Indeed, much of the disagreement between
Justice Souter and Chief Justice Rehnquist is framed in terms of their
respective approaches to the problem of determining which interests
are to receive constitutional protection. Nevertheless, although the
general formal methodology adopted will lean toward a particular
substantive preference, it will not be decisive. To believe otherwise
would be to disregard entirely Gadamer's primary insight that there is
no necessary connection between truths and methods; whether one is
an originalist, a textualist, an interpretivist, or any other stripe of
constitutional jurist will not of itself determine the result reached.
While the adoption of a specific interpretive approach on a specific
occasion will make certain outcomes more likely and more justifiable
than others, it is the substantive political prejudices or, Souter has it,
the "merely personal and private notions" of justice of any particular
219
judge that begins and ends the process.
At the end of the day, it seems apparent that Justice Souter was
not sufficiently enamored of the claimed physician-assisted right to
die as to warrant its recognition. But this was not because it failed the
"tradition test, 220 but because it was not fundamental in Souter's
scheme of justice. If he had wanted to recognize such a right, there
were ample rhetorical resources for him to draw upon in fashioning a
hermeneutically adequate argument. However, as with the decision
he actually made, the "acceptability of the result will be a function of
the good reasons given" 221 and, without some account of the particular
prejudices that motivate and constitute him, those reasons are
lacking. As Gadamer himself noted, "there is undoubtedly no
understanding that is free of all prejudices. 222 Gadamer insisted that
a large part of the hermeneutical performance entailed a sustained
effort to "distinguish the true prejudices, by which we understand,
2 23 even if this cannot
from the false ones, by which we misunderstand,"
be done outside the very historical (and, therefore, political) process
at which efforts are being made to understand. Souter seems not to
219. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SICLE (1997). That
having been said, I do not want to suggest that all adjudication is simply a hoax or a sham. See
HUTCHINSON, supra note 12, at 180-89.
220. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 770.
221. Id.
222. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 490.
223. Id. at 298-99.
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take seriously the fact that any method, including his proffered
"reasoned judgment," will retain some element of prejudice; what
Souter terms the "merely personal and private notions" 224 of justice of
any particular judge and what I call simply political commitments. As
Gadamer warned, unless there is a constant struggle to identify rather
than to ignore those prejudices, interpretation will become enslaved
to "the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to what
speaks to us in the tradition. '22 It is the act of hiding those prejudices
that is the problem, not the acknowledgment of their existence;
interpretation is part of, not apart from, political commitments. The
refusal to recognize the importance of those political commitments
means that tradition loses its vital quality as "a living thing" or, as I
put it, a work-in-progress. While Justice Souter, Mootz, and others
are content to leave the sources and direction of its development to
some almost mystical historical Volkgeist, I prefer to see it for what it
is-a heuristic device that does the bidding, no matter how tentative
and provisional, of its social artisans and judicial arbiters.
In conclusion, therefore, it can be reported that Justice Souter's
judgment in Glucksberg is not the masterful piece of hermeneutical
artistry that he wants it to be or his jurisprudential admirers wish it to
be; the reasons given for the result are not good enough to warrant its
acceptability.
If Mootz's suggestion that "Souter's opinion
persuasively describes the adjudication of fundamental rights as a
hermeneutical-rhetorical project in terms that Gadamer... would
endorse 2 6 is right, then Gadamer's hermeneutical-rhetorical project
is seriously deficient and in need of substantial reformulation. And
that is exactly what I have recommended. It is only on a more critical
and radical reading of Gadamer that it is possible to provide a
compelling account of common law adjudication. While there is some
objective basis to the protected values and the rhetorical methods
used to develop doctrine and to decide cases, there is none that stands
entirely apart from the "merely personal and private notions" of
justice of any particular judge; there is a constant "toing" and
"froing" between the objective and the personal and between the
public and the private that defines and energizes legal and judicial
traditions. Understood in this way as works-in-progress, there do not
exist recognizable traditions in law, which allow judges to engage with

224. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767.
225. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 270.
226. Mootz, supra note 26, at 326.
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contested matters of social practices in an objectively determinate and
neutrally defensible way because those traditions are so much part of
the very politics that they are claimed to bypass or obviate. However,
this assessment does not sound the death-knell for common law
adjudication. On the contrary, it can give it a renewed vigor and
special relevance. It is to an elaboration of this possibility that I turn
in the last part of the Article.
IX. RADICAL REPERCUSSIONS

If law and adjudicative practice is anything to go by, there is, as
Gadamer says, "something that hermeneutical reflection teaches
us. '227 But it is not "that social community, with all its tensions and
disruptions, ever and ever again leads back to a common area of
social understanding through which it exists. '228 This is wishful
thinking that does much more harm than good; it gives established
and dominant values priority over marginalized and subversive ones
simply because-and this is the crucial point-they are established
and dominant. What hermeneutical reflection might teach us is that
the extant traditions of discursive convention that make agreement
possible are as much a result of force and power as of consensus and
agreement.

Commonality is not the same as sharedness; such an

equivalence needs to be actively demonstrated rather than passively
assumed. There is a politics to all of this that Gadamer either ignores
or downplays. It is not so much that values and reason are entirely
collapsible into ideology and power; this is a nihilistic scenario that
can withstand neither historical scrutiny nor critical analysis. It is that
reason and power do not stand separate from or over the other. In a
similar way that values and reason operate within the context of
ideology and power, so are ideology and power affected by values and
reason. To rework Justice Souter's chosen Gadamerianesque line
that "the acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons
[given], ' 229 it is that the goodness of the reasons (i.e., their rhetorical
effectiveness) and the acceptability of the results (i.e., their political
resonance) interact and function together; what counts as good
reasons are not separate from the political context in which they arise
and into which they intervene. Rhetorical knowledge, therefore,
functions with, within, and upon political conditions. In legal terms,
227. GADAMER, supra note 81, at 42.
228. Id.
229. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 770.
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the connection between law as one kind of rhetorical activity and
politics as another is one of interpenetration and fluidity, not
independence and boundedness.
In the particular debate at hand in Glucksberg, the quality and
ferocity of the political forces at work are much more muted
(although not absent) than in other contested areas of constitutional
controversy, such as abortion and homosexuality. Like all the related
questions of death and dying, assisted suicide provokes an endless
debate. It is not unreasonable to assert that, while medical technology has done much to improve health and combat suffering, it has
also created entirely new situations that have so affected humankind
that it has changed the world. In such a society, the power to define
and control this continuing social revolution is inevitably political. In
the same way that philosophy has a history and, therefore, a politics,
so moral philosophizing about life and death is embedded within
certain historical protocols of professional and technological power;
medical practice and the health industry begin to construct and
validate the rationality by which its problems and their solutions are
resolved. As the pace of medical innovation ever quickens, anxiety
has become so pervasive and profound that there has come to exist "a
state of epistemological turbulence ...[in which] rather than studying
social phenomena as if they were natural phenomena, scientists now
'230
study natural phenomena as if they were social phenomena.
Against this chilling backdrop, it is naive at best for Justice Souter to
maintain that the constitutional dimension of these matters can be
settled in an exclusively technical and legal manner that obviates or
sidesteps reference to these deeper and more tumultuous debates.
Although Souter is not short of company in this conceit, he is no less
culpable for his presumption. Reason is as disciplined as disciplining
in its interaction with the sociopolitics of bioethics and health care.
In putting forward the account that I have, I am not suggesting
that adjudication is somehow an unmitigated sham or that judges are
involved in a dark conspiracy to thwart democratic justice. While
there are instances when such condemnatory characterization is not
far off the mark, I accept that judges do act in good faith in their
efforts to meet their professional expectations. Nor am I suggesting
230. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 34 (1995). For a broader assessment of this
trend, see ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 204 (1992). See
generally IVAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE: MEDICAL NEMESIS, THE EXPROPRIATION OF
HEALTH (1976).
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that the inexorable consequence of accepting that "law is politics" is
to unveil politics and, therefore, law as an exercise in arbitrary and
unreasoned decision making. Such an account does justice neither to
judges and mainstream jurists nor to me and most other critical
scholars. My insistence that "law is politics" is no more (and no less)
than a claim that it is not possible to engage in adjudication without
also being drawn into and taking a stand on contested political
matters. Judges bring to their official duties what Holmes famously
called "deep-seated preferences."2 31 They do run very deep and are
often so seated that their holder has little sense of them. But I do not
believe that they "can not be argued about" 232 or that they do not
change, even if they sometimes change through nonrational
persuasion. And I certainly do not believe that "when differences are
sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let
'233
him have his way" or that "his grounds are just as good as ours.
While the former response needs little serious rebuttal (and
presumably was not intended to be taken literally by Holmes), the
latter remark implies that the only alternatives to an objective
morality or rationality is a desultory relativism in which "anything
goes" or an apocalyptic nihilism in which arbitrariness is the only
mark of political commitment. Both of these possible alternatives say
more about mainstream jurists and their inability to get beyond their
own limited and limiting understandings than anything else. For such
judges and jurists, there is no viable or defensible choice other than
objectivity or subjectivity; anything that does not live up to the
objective standards of truth is mere conviction, convention, ideology,
and opinion. 234 As Justice Souter puts it, it is a matter of "reasoned
personal and private notions"
judgment" or reliance on the "merely
235
of justice of any particular judge.
Yet it is completely wrong-headed to insist that the loss of
objectivity in the transcendent sense means that all interpretations
are subjective and all truths are relative. It is entirely possible and
reasonable to insist that, although the traditional search for
objectivity is a lost cause, there are not only subjective opinions and

231. O.W. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 312 (P. Smith ed., 1921).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 7, 22, 73, 119, 133 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity
and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFS. 87 (1996).
235. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769, 767 (1997).
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relative truths. Instead, it might be arguable that one truth is not as
good as another if one understands by truth nothing more than that it
meets the familiar procedures of justification that hold sway; there
are only better and worse views in advancing the substantive cause of
political justice. Justification is a hermeneutical practice and what
works or counts as good or reasons will depend on the social and,
therefore, political context in which justification is sought and
offered. Accordingly, in law and life generally, rhetorical success is
not vouchsafed by reliance upon a particular method, but by the
usefulness of the results arrived at and their effect upon meeting
certain objectives that are taken to be morally or politically
significant. Preferring hope over knowledge, it insists that moral
choice is "always a matter of compromise between competing goods
rather than a choice between the absolutely right and the absolutely
wrong. 23 6 Stressing the historical quality of that compromise, this is
the unrelenting message of a radical version of Gadamerian
hermeneutics. Accordingly, while I believe that such "deep-seated
preferences" are not rational in the sense of lending themselves to
some objective validation or refutation, I do not believe that they are
arbitrary or immoveable; reasoned exchange and argument can occur
so long as reason is understood as historically contingent, socially
constructed, and politically charged. There is no epistemology or
metaphysics that operates as something above rhetoric. Like debates
about substance, there is nothing beyond persuasion among real
people in real situations. Contrary to much jurisprudential thinking,
the problem is not the intervention of power in the halls of reason,
but the resilient belief that power can be somehow excluded and that
there exists some noncultural and nonsocial standard of
reasonableness. Disabused of this notion, the democratic ambition
becomes not one of warranting that reason is detached from value or
power, but of ensuring that the values and interests that help
constitute reason represent and are conducive to a truly democratic
society.
The desire of Justice Souter, his colleagues, and most jurists to
present adjudication as a bounded and objective enterprise in which
236. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE, at xxix (1999); see RICHARD
RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, REALISM AND TRUTH 22-24 (1991); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 209 (1979); H. PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 115
(1988); RICHARD RORTY, Texts and Lumps, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 65, at 81;

Richard Rorty, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in W. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
20-46 (1953).
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reasoned judgment can dissolve and resolve problems that have
proved inhospitable to legislative resolution is understandable, but
misplaced. Not only is there no way to achieve such an ambition, but
the continuing attempts to do so merely exacerbate the problem by
rendering the juristic establishment complicitous and culpable,
thereby eroding the very confidence that they are trying to build. The
best response by judges and jurists would be to acknowledge that
adjudication in a society of diverse and conflicting politics is an
inevitably political undertaking. Once this is done, courts will not
necessarily become otiose or surplus to democratic requirements.237
Instead, it might be accepted that both courts and legislatures are
involved in the same game, namely fashioning and implementing a
theory and practice of democracy that can deliver substantive answers
to concrete problems. And, in doing that, neither courts nor
legislatures have a lock on political judgment about what it is best to
do. For example, although Justice Souter states that legislatures are
the place to engage in "fact-finding and experimentation 23 8 which
"should be out of the question in constitutional adjudication,"23 9 he
does concede that "sometimes a court may be bound to act regardless
of the institutional preferability of the political branches as forums for
On the issue in hand in
addressing constitutional claims. ' 240
Glucksberg, he actually concluded that "I do not decide for all time
that respondents' claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the
legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal with that
claim at this time." 241 This seems to be right. The respective
responsibilities of judges and legislators cannot be defined outside the
never ending debate about what democracy demands and is best
served by at any particular time. In both judicial and legislative
decision making, it is mistaken to allow theoretical principle to be the
enemy of pragmatic good or general institutional competence to be
the enemy of specific substantive good. What courts and legislatures
do, as well as how that work is divided, is a highly political matter
whose resolution will inevitably be contingent, contextual, and
237. Of course, such a conclusion might well be reached in determining whether at any
particular time courts do more substantive harm than good. See generally ALLAN C.
HUTCHINSON, WAITING FOR CORAF: A CRITIQUE OF LAW AND RIGHTS (1995).
238. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997).
239. Id. at 789.
240. Id. at 787.
241. Id. at 789. For a fuller treatment of the institutional competence issue, see Allan C.
Hutchinson, The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF
LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 196, 215-23 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999).
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contested.
While the jurisprudential effort to re-present law and adjudication as hermeneutical practices of rhetorical persuasion is a
considerable advance over the traditional classification of them as
philosophical exercises in principled ratiocination, jurists are still too
willing to ignore the political dimensions of common law adjudication. As I have emphasized throughout this Article, the historicization of common law and adjudication must also entail its
politicization. An example of the consequences of failing to politicize
as well as historicize is provided by the common law itself. In times
past, the legitimacy of the common law and, therefore, the authority
of judges were taken as residing in the fact that the common law was
an artifact of the community whose values the judges were entrusted
to articulate and represent. While judges had considerable discretion
in performing this task, they were not completely left to their own
devices; the common law comprises a process whereby its rules can be
updated and refreshed in accordance with changing social norms.2 42
Nonetheless, so long as those customary values were fairly
homogeneous and broadly based, the pragmatic judicial effort to
combine formal law and customary values appeared to be relatively
apolitical and neutral. However, once that fact or pretence is relaxed,
the cogency of such a claim soon begins to unravel. In other words, if
historicization occurs without politicization, the very quality and
character of common law adjudication still remains undisclosed. It is
only when a more overtly political inquiry to historical context is
made that the adjudicative tradition is understood in more useful and
appropriate terms.
In presenting adjudication in this light, it should become clear
that it is not that there is no resort to political values, only that the
shared nature of those values gives the appearance that the judicial
performance is objective. If there is conflict over the values to be
incorporated in the law, the political nature of adjudication is simply
revealed rather than hidden; it is not that politics somehow begins to
intrude in what is otherwise an apolitical process. The choice to
uphold the status quo or traditional values is no less (and no more)
political than the decision to rupture or reinterpret those values in the
name of an emancipatory impulse. As Gadamer is at pains to
242. See MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (2d ed.
1716); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1850 (1977);
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1957).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1015

emphasize, "preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are
revolution and renewal. 2 43 Any engagement with and within
tradition is political in that it involves choice between competing ways
of presently making the past the best future that it can be. As such, it
is traditionalism that is to be deplored, not tradition itself. The
allegedly uncritical preservation of static commitments is bogus
because, when understood in the more radical way that I recommend,
the tradition itself is so capacious, nuanced, multitextured, motile,
diffuse, and irrepressible that there is no one simple given tradition
whose name it is possible to be claiming to act in. Accordingly, when
the common law is politicized as well as historicized, it becomes
clearer that, rather than celebrate tradition as a source of authority
and meaning, it is authority that is the source of tradition's meaning;
tradition can no more ground authority or meaning than anything
else. Authority and meaning, like tradition, are to be earned in the
rhetorical give-and-take of hermeneutical exchange. And such a
historical exchange is only properly appreciated when its political
context is grasped, admittedly in an inevitably partial, incomplete,
and contingent way. As such, the common law is more usefully
understood as a radical work-in-progress.
Consequently, the emancipatory task of a radical hermeneutics is
not exhausted in the important effort of unmasking traditionfollowing initiatives as inevitable interventions in and of politics.
Although the critical significance of this demonstration is not to be
underestimated, it is also important to point out the inner
contradictions, negations, elisions, and tensions within the tradition so
that they can be appropriated, reformulated, and worked to
progressive effect. Because adjudicative decision making is context
dependent and it will never be possible to delineate the relevant
context with sufficient completeness, certainty or detail, the exercise
of judicial discretion will always have to be an indispensable
dimension of judgment or choice; the judges' moral values and
political commitments or, as Justice Souter puts it, the "merely
personal and private notions" 44 of justice of any particular judge will
confound any attempt to turn legal adjudication into a largely
technical and objective reckoning rather than a contestable
commitment to particular values and interests. Moreover, even if it
were, it is surely the case that "being just is not a matter of
243. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 281-82.
244. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767.
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calculation" and "a democracy or politics that we simply
calculate ... would be a terrible thing. '245 Consequently, rather than
view the critical claim that "law is politics" as an indictment of
adjudication or as a betrayal of democracy, it is surely better to treat
such an assessment as opening up the possibility for law and
adjudication to meet its democratic obligations and satisfy the
expectations that it places on itself to dispense justice. Judges do this
best when, instead of pretending that law is bounded and objective,
they neither mask their political commitments nor grind a favored
political axe; they must put those values in curial play so as to
interrogate and rework them better. Aware that tradition is never
statically given, but is always open to dynamic reinterpretation,
judges will go on doing what they have always done, albeit more
candidly and less cowardly, of seeking to make a critical
accommodation with and within legal tradition by "combining heresy
and heritage into fruitful tension. ' 246 However, what is "fruitful" will
itself be contingent and contested so that there is no fully settled or
adequate combination that can claim to be authoritative by dint of its
balance or fruitfulness. To be in a state of tension is not aberrational
or anomalous, but is the usual experience of a tradition.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have sought to offer a reading of Gadamer,
tradition, and the common law as a work-in-progress. In particular, I
have put forward my Gadamer, not some objective or essential
Gadamer who stands over and supervises the meaning of his own
text; to think that were possible would be to miss some of the most
dominant themes in his work, namely the author's lack of authority,
the contingency of the interpretive act, and the applicative
indeterminacy of the text. My goal, therefore, has not been to argue
over the correct interpretation of Gadamer's text. This would be silly
and an insult to Gadamer himself. As he concludes in his masterly
work, "it would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have,
or had to have, the last word. 2 47 However, some jurists have not
been able to resist that temptation and they have put Gadamer's
authority to work in supporting the adjudicative tradition of the
common law. That effort has tended to blunt any political edge that a
245. DERRIDA, supra note 162, at 17, 19.
246. PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 23 (1968).
247. GADAMER, supra note 2, at 579.
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legal hermeneutics might have. When choice and contingency are
thrown into the mix, the result is an unstable concoction that
challenges all that is taken for granted or assumed. But it is not to be
feared. On the contrary, it provides an opportunity for transformation and renewal. What it does not do is render all knowledge
illusory, all truths falsehoods, all order chaotic, and all objectivity
sham. In contrast to its conservative sibling, a radical jurisprudence
does not hedge on the subversive implications of the hermeneutical
insight; it makes no artificial distinction between what is and is not up
for grabs. Because everything has been constructed, everything can
be deconstructed and reconstructed. By failing to politicize the
historical imperative of hermeneutics, conservatives apprehend more
benign and accidental forces at work in social life than is the case;
they mistake commonality for sharedness and acquiescence for
acceptance. In law, this means that legal reasoning must be treated as
being as much about political power as it is about ethical consensus; it
is thoroughly and relentlessly a work-in-progress.
In part, Gadamer is at least partially to blame for this state of
affairs. There is a fatalistic as well as a quietistic aspect to Gadamer:
he comes close to insisting that things are simply the way they are and
that there is little that can be done other than to accept that. I have
tried to argue in this Article that not only can Gadamer be read in a
more radical and less conservative style, but also that social, legal, and
hermeneutical traditions are much more transformative and less
determinate than Gadamer or his jurisprudential disciples allow:
"[T]he willingness of many social and legal theorists to suppress such
dynamism in favor of a 'stable' status quo is itself but a rhetorical
device. ' 248 Contrary to the fearful scholarship of Gadamer and his
conservative interpreters, this acknowledgment is not a precursor to
chaos or anarchy; it is an invitation to challenge the status quo, to
change the world for the better, and to argue constantly about what
"better" is and demands. Most importantly, my effort to advocate a
radical hermeneutics is most definitely not intended to demonstrate
how meaning and understanding are impossible. On the contrary, it
is devoted to showing how meaning and understanding are possible at
all by elucidating the historical processes, social practices, and
material interests within which meaning and understanding arise.
The critical dimension is on tracing the political consequences of
248. Mark Burton, Critique and Comment: Determinacy, Indeterminacy and Rhetoric in a
PluralistWorld, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 544, 582 (1997).
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meaning's endless instability, not the frankly ludicrous project of
demonstrating meaning's impossibility.

